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ABSTRACT 
This Article—the second half of a diptych that begins with Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality 
Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455 (2020)—seeks to fill in the academic void in feminist and constitutional 
scholarship by developing the constitutional argument for marital freedom as a gender equality right. The previous 
Article showed that a constitutional regime committed to substantive gender equality must provide a readily 
available exit from marriage to disestablish sexist relations and alleviate gender stratification. This Article 
continues this project by constructing a constitutional argument for marital freedom under formal equality theory. 
It shows that divorce-restrictive regulations were historically animated by discriminatory purposes and that fault 
grounds continue to be applied in ways that raise equal protection concerns.  It further shows that the contemporary 
movement to restrict divorce repeats history: its impetus is to shore up the hierarchical family structure based on 
constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women to the constraining sex-roles of the separate-spheres 
tradition. The Article concludes that the dictates of constitutional gender equality, however narrowly defined, 
require the state to provide a liberal no-fault right of exit from the status-harm of subordinating marriages.  Marital 
freedom is thus not simply a legal remedy for broken hearts, but the linchpin of a social order committed to securing 
genuine gender equality and human dignity for all women. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The previous Article in this diptych, Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality 
Right,1 argued that substantive mandates of equal protection—largely 
understood through the prism of an anti-subordination theory—require 
constitutional recognition of a right to marital freedom.  This Article 
develops the same constitutional argument from an antidiscrimination 
vantage point, employing the formal doctrinal framework through which the 
Supreme Court analyzes questions of gender equality. 
Strict divorce laws, the previous Article observed, do not overtly 
discriminate between the sexes, but they disproportionately harm women 
nevertheless.2  The previous Article further maintained that divorce 
restrictions that lock women into marriages in which abuse may reign and 
sex roles are rigidly assigned channel women into circumscribed lives and 
impede their progress toward full citizenship status.  In this way, divorce 
restrictions are covert gender-based legislation, perpetuating gender 
stratification in effect, even though they are sex-neutral in form.   
In part, the disparate impact of such legislation is felt because men’s and 
women’s experiences with marriage are so different—divorce restrictions 
preserve relationships that are sites for subordination for many women and 
that exacerbate gender inequalities even outside of marriage.3  As a result, 
women have largely been the prime suitors of marital freedom; the 
feminization of divorce thus elicits the gendered operation of neutral 
impediments to exit.4  Divorce restrictions also have a disparate impact 
because the costs of delay are much higher for women than for men.  
 
 1 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455 (2020). 
 2 See generally Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Substantive Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
455 (2020). 
 3  Id.  Perhaps the most thoughtful exposition of this argument was made by the early feminist 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as powerfully maintained in Professor Tracy A. Thomas’s award-winning 
book, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & THE FEMINIST FOUNDATIONS OF FAMILY LAW (N.Y.U. 
Press 2016).  As the book shows, the call for a reform of the private sphere of the family as key to 
women’s equality had nineteenth-century roots.  For Stanton, divorce was not simply a gender 
equality right; it was, in some cases, a gender duty that enabled women to enforce their own vision 
of marriage and transform this relationship into a more egalitarian union.  See THOMAS, supra, at 
ch. 3. 
 4        On the concept of the “feminization of divorce,” see Karin Carmit Yefet, Unchaining the Agunot: 
Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women’s Marital Freedom, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 441, 
451 (2009). 
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Women’s reproductive capacity and—arguably their marriageability—
declines far more rapidly than men’s as they age.  Consequently, divorce 
regimes that make women wait impair their post-divorce prospects of 
remarrying and having children.5  Moreover, the feminization of poverty 
renders burdensome—and therefore prohibitively expensive—divorce 
procedures particularly detrimental for women6 and may force some to forgo 
divorce altogether.7  The onerous burdens of divorce restrictions on women 
are so pronounced that some commentators have envisaged a divorce model 
that reserves a unilateral right of exit to women only.8  
 
 5 Voluminous research establishes that women’s supposed value in the marriage market 
“depreciates” relative to men’s as they get older, due to different mortality rates, the presence of 
children, and many men's lingering preference for younger women.  See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, 
Divorce and Quasi Rents: Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 278–87 
(1987) (discussing the reasons why woman’s perceived marriageability declines with age); Katharine 
T. Bartlett, Saving the Family From the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 840 (1998) (same); Amy 
L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 
509, 547–50 (1998) (discussing the different currency of men and women in the marriage market). 
 6 See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, The Cost of Fault-Based Divorce, 82 SUPRA 131 (2013); Molly Dragiewicz & 
Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical Data for Lawyers Considering Equal 
Protection Analysis, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 229, 244 (2009) (referencing studies 
discussing women’s lower socioeconomic status and linking it to gender subordination in the private 
and public spheres); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS: 
CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE 
HOUSING MARKET 39, 44 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988) (noting the substantial costs of fault-
based divorce litigation).  No-fault divorce, in marked contrast, leads to a significantly less costly 
divorce, as it rarely involves court, attorneys, or other costs.  See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE 
AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 148 (1991); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 165 (1991). 
 7 Indeed, research has found that the entire divorce process is shaped by the inability of many women 
to afford proper representation and handle fault proceedings.  See Schafran, supra note 6; Jane 
Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt? Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic 
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 624 (1999); Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at 
Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 713, 715–16 (2000); Penelope E. Bryan, Woman’s Freedom to Contract 
at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1174–80 (1999); Karen Czapanskiy, 
Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 
FAM. L.Q. 247, 250–51 n.11 (1993); Cynthia M. VanSickle, A Return to the Anti-Feminist Past of Divorce 
Law: The Implications of the Covenant or Marriage Laws as Applied to Women, 6 J.L. SOC’Y 154, 167–68 
(2005).  Judges exacerbate this problem by their frequent refusal to award attorney fees during 
and/or after the divorce proceeding.  Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 
42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (1990); Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. 
REV. 485, 528, 550–51 (1993). 
 8 See, e.g., Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage “for the Sake of the Children”: A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth 
Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435, 1450 n.77 (1992). 
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To these substantial gender disparities in neutral impediments to exit, 
however, the Supreme Court’s formal equality jurisprudence is largely 
indifferent.  The Court’s gender-discrimination doctrine treats marriage as 
an institution devoid of special equal-protection concerns for women and 
thus ignores the gendered harm wrought by family regulations so long as they 
are facially neutral and have no discriminatory purpose.  In so doing, the 
formal understanding of equality effectively effaces the gender-specific effects 
of divorce policies that enforce status relations between men and women.  
Limits on divorce thus expose the limits of sex-neutrality and formal equality 
principles as a vehicle for the advancement of substantive gender equality.  
This Article contends that a unilateral right to no-fault divorce is 
constitutionally mandated—even under the Court’s narrow anti- 
discrimination-oriented jurisprudence.  The constitutional argument for 
marital freedom as a formal gender-equality right is developed in three Parts. 
Part I delineates and dissects the formal paradigm of equal-protection 
doctrine.  In essence, the Supreme Court pivots its equality jurisprudence on 
the antidiscrimination principle, which only prohibits state action that 
overtly classifies citizens on the basis of group membership or that is 
ostensibly neutral but in fact motivated by a discriminatory purpose.  
Part II exposes the lineage and function of divorce restrictions as gender-
status regulations and shows that limitations on divorce have been associated 
historically with either the patriarchal desire to control women or the 
paternalistic effort to protect them.  The fault system in particular—
traditionally based on the unholy trinity of adultery, cruelty, and desertion as 
all-American grounds for dissolution9—reflected the ideology of the 
separate-spheres tradition, which the government is prohibited from 
enforcing by the antidiscrimination interpretation of equality.  Even today, 
as shown in Part II, the judicial implementation of fault divorce is susceptible 
to gender-based stereotyping that inculcates the repressive elements of the 
traditional family structure.  
Finally, Part III argues that contemporary attempts to restrict divorce 
and reinstate fault thresholds repeat history and are animated, at least in part, 
by a discriminatory purpose: to shore up the hierarchical marital family 
 
 9  J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34 
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 13 (1997).  For an overview of traditional fault grounds and what they entail, see 
HOMER H. CLARK JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
656–59 (7th ed. 2005). 
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predicated on constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women to 
the roles of wives and mothers.  The conservative family values coalition, in 
particular, seeks to legally resuscitate the ideological origins of the fault 
system, based on impermissible status-based judgments about women’s 
capacities, roles, and destinies.  
The Article concludes that existing, purportedly neutral barriers to exit 
are unconstitutional violations of formal gender equality since they have both 
the purpose and effect of turning back the clock—not only on divorce rights, 
but also on women’s status in the family and society.   
I.  THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE: A FORMAL  
GENDER-EQUALITY PARADIGM 
Grounded in experience with slavery and racial segregation, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been 
understood to guard against the false theory of racial difference and black 
inferiority.10  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has long 
stressed the principle of color-blindness or “anti-discrimination” as the 
mediating principle at the core of equal protection.11  By virtue of this 
principle, also called the “anti-classification” or “anti-differentiation” 
principle, state classifications on “suspect” bases are invalid unless they satisfy 
the constitutional touchstones of strict scrutiny.12  Where a law creates no 
 
 10 See, e.g., Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 
111, 111–12 (1991) (“[T]he central meaning of the equal protection clause, and indeed of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, is that the law must be colorblind.”).  
 11 See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) (“The 
antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because . . . race-dependent decisions that are 
rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on 
assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the related phenomenon of racially 
selective sympathy and indifference.”); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1004–06 (1986) (explaining that the “anti-differentiation” 
principle underlies heightened scrutiny models and demands “equal treatment”); Owen M. Fiss, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (emphasizing that the 
“antidiscrimination principle” is a “mediating principle” that bridges the facial ambiguity of the 
text of the Equal Protection Clause and the judicially crafted meaning contained therein). 
 12 Classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage have all been considered “suspect” 
classes deserving of strict scrutiny, the strictest level of judicial review.  See  Foley v. Connelie, 435 
U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (noting that prior cases that involved state discrimination against “aliens 
as a class” prompted “close scrutiny” but declining to adopt a bright-line rule); San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting “traditional indicia of suspectness” that might 
warrant heightened scrutiny as a class “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history 
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express classifications but still has a disparate impact on a suspect group, the 
Supreme Court finds discrimination only if the state acted with 
discriminatory intent in enacting the facially neutral law.13   
Given the racial context of the Equal Protection Clause, how does it apply 
to laws that forge sex-based classifications or that utilize sex-neutral terms but 
exert a gendered impact?  For the first hundred years of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s life, the Supreme Court routinely upheld legislation that 
relegated women to secondary status, in opinions replete with separate-
spheres discourse affirming distinct roles for men and women in American 
society.14  Only since the 1970s has the Court acknowledged that the Equal 
Protection Clause is relevant to questions of gender justice.15  The Court 
developed its gender-equality doctrine in an ahistorical manner by analogy 
to its race-equality doctrine,16 establishing a “de facto ERA”17 that judges 
sex-based classifications using a new level of intermediate scrutiny.18  To be 
 
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a history of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and 
insular’ minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”) (quoting United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 
(1967) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be 
subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . .”) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
216 (1944)); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (explaining that “only the most 
exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination” based on “racial descent”). 
 13 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 246 (1976) (requiring challengers of facially 
neutral state action to demonstrate that the challenged practice was animated by a discriminatory 
purpose). 
 14 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding the automatic exclusion of women from 
jury duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a prohibition on female bartenders); 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitations on the hours worked by women). 
 15 See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (invalidating, for the first time, a gender classification; 
using the rational basis test to invalidate a preference for males over females as executors of wills). 
 16 Justice Brennan was the first to make this argument.  See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
682–88 (1973) (concluding that sex-based discrimination is akin to race discrimination in that it is 
based on historical stereotypes and “immutable characteristics” wholly unrelated to one’s ability to 
“contribute to society”) (plurality opinion). 
 17 Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection 
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 985 (2002)). 
 18 See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531–58 (1996) (applying a form of intermediate 
scrutiny requiring “exceedingly persuasive justification” and ultimately holding as unconstitutional 
the Virginia Military Institute’s all-male admissions policy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724–31, 733 (1982) (applying a form of intermediate scrutiny that examined motivating 
biases and stereotypes; holding a state-sponsored all-female nursing school unconstitutional, in part 
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upheld, sex-based classifications must be substantially related to an important 
government objective.19   
Further, any justification for sex-based classifications must not be based 
on gender-role stereotypes.20  In a long line of equal-protection cases, the 
Court invalidated gender classifications in family law because they reflected 
sexual stereotypes of the separate-spheres tradition that presume, on the one 
hand, breadwinning husbands, and on the other, domesticated wives focused 
on home and married life.21  The Court indicated that the traditional and 
even settled beliefs about women’s proper gender roles in the family and in 
society, far from vindicating discrimination, are now a barometer  
of constitutional invalidity.22  The Court has thus understood “anti-
stereotyping” to be a central aspect of gender equal protection.23   
 
because it was based on stereotypes about gender in nursing); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–
204, 210 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a statute prohibiting the sale of beer 
to underage males only); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 653 (1975) (applying a 
heightened standard of scrutiny to invalidate a provision of the Social Security Act giving survivor 
benefits to females only). 
 19 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).  Some suggest that the VMI case 
introduced “skeptical scrutiny” to sex-based discrimination, which “differs from strict scrutiny only 
in name.”  Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of Marriage Law, 
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233–35 (1998); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY 
RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 62 (2005) (positing that “the Supreme Court 
may be raising the level of scrutiny for gender much closer to that of race” after VMI). 
 20 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141–42, 146 (1994) (holding that gender-based 
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where the discrimination 
is informed by gender stereotypes). 
 21  See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725–26, 726 n.14 (noting the “broad range of statutes already invalidated by 
[the] Court” that were based on “simplistic, outdated assumption[s]” about gender); see, e.g., Orr 
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause a state law provision based on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that accorded 
ex-wives but not ex-husbands the right to receive alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 
(1977) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a statute, based 
on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that required widowers—but not widows—to prove 
dependency on their deceased spouses in order to receive OASDI benefits). 
 22 See e.g., Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (“Where . . . the State’s . . . purposes are as well served by a gender-
neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual 
stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–
99 (holding impermissible the “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females 
in the home rather than in ‘the marketplace and world of ideas’”) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7, 15 (1975). 
 23 The Supreme Court has consistently held that state laws and practices reflecting stereotypical 
assumptions about women’s proper roles are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.  See David 
H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination 
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While the Court subjects overt sex-based classifications to heightened 
scrutiny, in the context of sex it has also adopted a stringent discriminatory 
intent requirement for laws that do not discriminate on their face.  In Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court held that facially neutral state 
action that has an adverse impact on women does not violate equal 
protection unless it was selected or reaffirmed “at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”24  In 
sum, the Court’s gender-equality jurisprudence, modeled after its race-
equality paradigm, sounds in formalistic anti-discrimination norms by 
focusing on the purpose and structure of challenged legislation, not on its 
impact, to ensure that state actors are not motivated by stereotypical 
judgments about women.25   
Recognizing that the Supreme Court equates discrimination with 
classification, regulatory bodies have wiped out traditional forms of gender-
status legislation and generally avoided justifying facially neutral regulations 
using discredited status-based reasoning.26  As a result, laws today are almost 
universally facially neutral and rationalized in non-discriminatory rhetoric, 
yet many still perpetuate, even aggravate, racial and gender stratification.27   
Thus, for example, absent evidence that state action was animated by a 
discriminatory purpose, many of the most oppressive common-law marital-
status doctrines—which were originally couched or recently have been 
redefined in facially neutral terms—now survive equal-protection scrutiny.28   
 
Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881, 1897 (1995) (noting the centrality of stereotyping analysis to 
modern sex discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 24 Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 25 See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (rejecting the proposition 
that “class-based animus can be determined solely by effect.”); cf. Robin West, Equality Theory, 
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 61 n.66 (1990) (noting 
that a problem with anti-subordination approaches to Equal Protection Clause is that courts have 
rejected them). 
 26 As Reva Siegel has explained, just as the conflicts culminating in the disestablishment of slavery 
and later segregation produced a shift in the justificatory rhetoric of racial-status laws, the 
discriminatory-purpose doctrine has caused a shift in the forms of state action that perpetuate the 
gender stratification of American society.  Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119–29 (1997). 
 27 Id. at 1111, 1131 (demonstrating that the Court’s current interpretation of equal protection 
“continues to authorize forms of state action that contribute to the racial and gender stratification 
of American society.”).  
 28 Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947, 1024–26 (2002). 
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Progressive constitutional commentators have thus scathingly critiqued 
the discriminatory purpose rule as outmoded in the wake of the 
disestablishment of overt forms of race and gender classification.29  They 
have further called for a new paradigm that would allow the Equal Protection 
Clause to meaningfully target the contemporary forms of protected groups’ 
subordination.30  The Supreme Court, however, has regrettably failed to 
modernize its equal-protection doctrine to rout out bias in ostensibly neutral 
state action.31 
  Parts II and III will assume the challenge of establishing the 
fundamental stature of marital freedom even under the formal dictates of 
constitutional gender equality, however narrowly defined. 
II.  DIVORCE RESTRICTIONS AS GENDER-STATUS REGULATION  
The Supreme Court recognizes that a policy’s historical background can 
influence its contemporary interpretation and aid in the deduction of 
present-day legislative intent.32  Analyzing divorce restrictions in historical 
perspective, this Part argues, illuminates their function as gender-caste 
legislation, a constitutionally significant feature otherwise obscured by their 
gender-neutral terminology. 
 
 29 See, e.g., David Kairys, More or Less Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004); Carlos A. 
Singer, The Stultification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 875, 882–83 
(2004); Siegel, supra note 26, at 1135–46; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of 
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991). 
 30 See e.g., Siegel, supra note 26, at 1144. 
 31 Id. at 1141–42.  For an egregious example, see Unites States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding sentencing guidelines that treated the possession of a given amount of crack cocaine 
equally to 100 times that amount of powder cocaine, even though over ninety percent of defendants 
possessing crack cocaine were blacks).  
 32 In order to demonstrate discriminatory purpose, an inquiry is made into whatever circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent is available, including the historical background of the decision, the 
specific sequence of events leading up to the decision, departures from normal procedural sequence, 
or the legislative or administrative history of the law.  See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).  See generally Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality 
Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) 
(discussing the importance of examining past regulatory practices as a way to detect otherwise tacit 
forms of bias in the motivation, justification, and structure of present regulatory practices); 
Catherine Wimberly, Deadbeat Dads, Welfare Moms, and Uncle Sam: How the Child Support Recovery Act 
Punishes Single-Mother Families, 53 STAN. L. REV. 729, 750 (2000) (discriminatory purpose may be 
“based on the statute’s legislative history as well as the general history of the problem the statute 
was supposed to solve”). 
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Using divorce restrictions to circumscribe women’s status in society is a 
strategy that has been applied by Western legislatures over the course of 
centuries.  Female-initiated divorce was perceived in many countries as a 
threat to the traditional social order, to husbandly authority and wifely 
domesticity.33  Indeed, the fear that divorce would force marriage to 
transmute into a more egalitarian relationship was key in restricting this 
remedy throughout history.34  Western legislatures thus often adopted 
stringent divorce policies with the express purpose of cementing hierarchical 
relations as the organizing principle of marriage and ensuring that women 
lived out their “destiny” as dutiful wives and mothers.35  In France, during 
 
 33 See, e.g., Joanna Alexandra Norland, When the Vow Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law Sounds 
a Warning About the Implications for Women of the Contemporary American Marriage Movement, 17 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 330–31 (2002); see also, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND 
THE FAMILY 18 (1989). 
 34 Norma Basch, Relief in the Premises: Divorce as a Woman’s Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815–1870, 8 
L. & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1990); see also Norland, supra note 33, at 330.  Indeed, divorce serves, as 
bargaining theory predicts, as a “tool that women use to secure change and greater equality in 
marital relationships.”  Carrie Yodanis, Divorce Culture and Marital Gender Equality: A Cross-National 
Study, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 644, 646 (2005).  As Albert Hirschman argued in a different context, 
an exit-threat point empowers a person to exercise a greater voice in influencing the course of events 
so as to spare the need for exit.  See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 
(1970).  
 35 Rules governing divorce in the Western World were often flagrantly discriminatory, allowing easy 
path to marital freedom for men, but not for women.  For example, in the Roman Empire, the law 
of Romulus, promulgated in 450 B.C., permitted divorce to husbands but refused it to their wives. 
Lawrence A. Moloney, Our Divorce Laws, 9 LOY. L. REV. 238, 240 (1923).  Likewise, in Greece, the 
husband enjoyed the sole prerogative to divorce his wife at will, for any or no reason.  The wife, 
however, was considered “incapable”; her only avenue to marital exit was to “submit a written 
claim for divorce before the archon, who was the traditional protector of all incapables.” 
See Kenneth Rigby, Report and Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the House Civil Law 
and Procedure Committee of the Louisiana Legislature Relative to the Reinstatement of Fault as a Prerequisite to a 
Divorce, 62 LA. L. REV. 561, 571 (2002).  In Athens, a husband could shed his wife by merely sending 
her away from his house; a woman, on the other hand, required the assistance of a male citizen to 
bring a divorce suit.  Id. at 572.  In England as well, divorce law was characterized by a double 
standard that made divorce more difficult to obtain for women.  See Karin Carmit Yefet, Marrying 
Dissolution to the Constitution: Divorce as a Fundamental Right, at ch. III, § II.A. (2012) 
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with author).  
          While some legislatures preferred strict, unequal divorce laws so as to secure the contractual 
gendered exchange of protection for obedience, for others “the relationship between husband and 
wife involved no such reciprocal entitlements.  It was simply required to replicate the dictatorial—
and insoluble—relationship of sovereign and minister.”  See Norland, supra note 33, at 341.  Yet, 
even when divorce law equally applied to both men and women, partisans of “neutral” divorce 
restrictions acknowledged that they would have an asymmetrical impact upon men and women 
and thus would contribute to patriarchal authority and to the establishment of a doctrine of male 
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the backlash to the French Revolution, for example, marital freedom 
represented both political and gender anarchy and a no-divorce regime was 
justified as a form of female control: “Just as political democracy, ‘allows the 
people, the weak part of political society, to rise against the established 
power,’ so divorce, ‘veritable domestic democracy,’ allows the wife, ‘the weak 
part,’ to rebel against marital authority.”36  Allowing women equal access to 
marital freedom also resulted in acrimonious debates over matters of gender 
and divorce in mid-nineteenth-century England.  In the legal imagination of 
many of these debates’ participants, liberal divorce law mounted a sustained 
challenge to marital hierarchy and undercut the foundations of masculine 
privilege and patriarchal authority in marriage.37  The early history of 
divorce debates in modern Italy also provides a powerful evincement of how 
the doctrine of indissoluble marriage was perceived as a keystone of male 
power and a major instrument for the cultivation of traditional gender roles 
in Italian society.38  Modern historians have shown how public deliberations 
and parliamentary records during Italy’s Liberal period conceptualized a no-
divorce regime as protecting masculinity and its attendant privileges while 
arguing that the introduction of divorce law was doomed to make “skirts into 
trousers,” subvert the established gender order, and radically alter the 
hierarchical architecture of the marital relationship.39  
That legislatures intended, at least in part, to control women’s status 
through limitations on exit is also apparent from feminist reactions to 
stringent divorce laws throughout history.  Understanding marital 
emancipation as a right articulating women’s social standing, an authority to 
govern their own lives as independent decisionmakers, and as a means of 
rebellion against intimate tyranny, feminists in many Western countries 
protested strict divorce laws as violative of their rights as equal citizens.  In 
France, Ireland, and such Latin American countries as Argentina and Chile, 
 
headship.  See, e.g., id. at 336 (“the imperative of relegating wives to a subordinate position within 
marriage necessitated additional restrictions on their right to petition for divorce.”); id. at 345–46.  
 36 LOUIS DE BONALD, DU DIVORCE CONSIDERE AU XIX SIÈCLE 182 (1818) (cited in JOAN 
WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 47 (1988)). 
 37   LAWRENCE STONE, THE ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530–1987, at 375 (1990).  
 38   For analysis of the history of divorce debates in Italy as reflecting a determination to protect 
traditional notions of masculinity and perpetuate the radical asymmetries of power underlying the 
Italian marriage contract, see Mark Seymour, Keystone of the Patriarchal Family? Indissoluble Marriage, 
Masculinity and Divorce in Liberal Italy, 10 J. MOD. ITALIAN STUD. 297 (2005). 
 39 Id. at 302 . 
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to take a few examples, feminists supported divorce law as “part of the 
process of achieving female equality before the law and as a solution to the 
age-old problems plaguing gender relations.”40  This long-held feminist 
perspective is borne out by recent statistics: research examining the cross-
national relationship between divorce culture on the national level and 
gender equality in intact marriages in twenty-two legal systems found that 
exit can exert a progressive transformative effect on patriarchal relationships.  
Strikingly, countries in which divorce is an accepted sociolegal act were 
clearly associated with greater marital equality, improved gender dynamics, 
and a more egalitarian sex-role division in the family.41 
Another recurring rationale for limiting marital exit was women’s 
perceived moral weakness.  Many legislatures sought rigid divorce laws 
because they perceived women as moral inferiors who would abandon their 
marriages if they only had the right to do so.42  Were women granted “the 
seemingly merciful concession of permitting one spouse to petition for 
divorce on the ground of adultery,” they posited, “women would stray 
brazenly so as to reclaim their freedom.”43  At times, however, anti-divorce 
crusaders carefully cloaked their attempts to control women in the 
paternalistic discourse of protection, with some arguing that “women bring 
 
 40  ASUNCION LAVRIN, WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND 
URUGUAY, 1890–1940, at 228–-29 (1995); see also Mala Htun, SEX AND THE STATE: ABORTION, 
DIVORCE, AND THE FAMILY UNDER LATIN AMERICAN DICTATORSHIPS AND DEMOCRACIES 96, 
104 (2003); Norland, supra note 33, at 327, 332, 338; Mags O’Brien, The History of Divorce in Ireland, 
in DIVORCE? FACING THE ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN 9–12 (1995) (showing that women 
figured prominently in divorce-action groups calling for the removal of the constitutional ban 
throughout Ireland’s history).  In the United States, however, there is a dissensus as to the role that 
feminists played in promoting divorce reform.  Compare Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s 
No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 301–02 (1987); JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, 
MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 147 (2014) 
(discerning that when gender equality figured on the reform agenda it “typically involved equality 
for men”); Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 
102 VA. L. REV. 79, 88 (2016) (arguing that men’s rights theorists called for a reform of fault 
divorce, which “they perceived as unjustly benefitting women and depriving men of their natural 
entitlements.”) with Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 
1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 846 (1983); Laura Oren, No-Fault Divorce Reform in the 1950s: The Lost History 
of the Greatest Project of the National Association of Women Lawyers, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 847 (2018) 
(recovering the lost history of the National Association of Women Lawyers’ struggle to achieve 
uniform no-fault divorce law reform in the 1950s). 
 41  Yodanis, supra note 34.   
 42 Norland, supra note 33, at 341.  
 43 Id. 
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to marriage a ‘capital’ that is ‘consumed’ at its first use” such that 
“indissoluble marriage represented an indemnity against the rapid 
depreciation of women’s ‘value.’”44  Yet others have justified limitations on 
divorce as a means to “protect” wives against the “indignities” of becoming 
single,45 even as they were in fact “aiming to reinforce the dependence of 
women on men within a hierarchical family structure.”46 
In the United States, the first half of this diptych observed, liberal divorce 
was considered anathema to the doctrine of marital unity and an affront to 
husbandly authority.47  Indeed, liberalization of divorce was sometimes 
openly opposed as jeopardizing male supremacy.48  Throughout American 
history, until the 1970s, marital exit was almost exclusively limited to fault-
based grounds, which envisioned divorce as a remedy for innocent spouses 
where the guilty party was considered “maritally impaired” and occasionally 
disqualified from remarrying.49  This regime “compensated” women for their 
common-law disabilities by “safeguarding” their marriages so long as they 
knew their place and properly performed their gendered marital roles.50  In 
 
 44   Seymour, supra note 38, at 310. 
 45 See, e.g., Norland, supra note 33, at 336 (explicating the sex-paternalist argument for divorce). 
 46 Id. at 322, 346 (recounting that while opponents of divorce “contended that they aimed to protect 
women from abandonment, the focus of their concerns was the potential of the wife to disrupt the 
social order by abandoning the nest.”). 
 47 See Yefet, supra note 2, at pt. II.A; see also THOMAS, supra note 3, at ch. 3. 
 48 See Yefet, supra note 2; see also Norland, supra note 33, at 324 (“Although the prohibition on divorce 
applied to men as well as to women, the impact of this restriction was asymmetrical.  It reinforced 
husbands’ authority by denying women an opportunity to exit, or even to exert leverage by 
threatening to do so.”). 
 49   See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tenn. 1955) (“Divorce in this state is not a matter 
to be worked out for the mutual accommodation of the parties in whatever manner they may desire, 
or in whatever manner the Court may deem to be fair and just under the circumstances.  It is 
conceived as a remedy for the innocent against the guilty.”); see also NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: 
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 49 (2000); ASHTON APPLEWHITE, CUTTING 
LOOSE: WHY WOMEN WHO END THEIR MARRIAGES DO SO WELL 62 (1997); Lawrence M. 
Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 653 (1984); Karl 
N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288–89 (1933) (showing the 
prohibition of remarriage to the “guilty” party was a common theme in  nineteenth-century U.S. 
legislation).  
 50 See, e.g., Gary L. Nichols, Covenant Marriage: Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 397, 426 (1998) (stating that until the no-fault divorce revolution, divorce law reinforced male 
dominance in society); Norland, supra note 33 at 337; Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: 
Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 654 (2002) (arguing that 
conformity with gendered norms benefited American women under the fault regime by legally 
protecting them from divorce as long as they were good homemakers and caretakers); id. at 667 
(stating that divorce was also viewed as a form of “punishment” for spouses who transgressed 
 
May 2020] DIVORCE AS A FORMAL GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT 807 
   
 
other words, the marital cage, stripping women of legal and economic 
independence, was celebrated as though it were a pedestal.51  
In what follows, this Part shows how a limited right to fault divorce not 
only burdened women’s exit but also concurrently enforced the gender status 
norms of the separate-spheres tradition.  Given the lineage of this divorce 
regulation, this Part argues, it seems perverse that the mere use of gender-
neutral language could immunize current fault policies from exacting 
constitutional review.   
A.  Sex Stereotypes in the Implementation of “Neutral” Divorce Legislation: A Look at 
Past and Recent History 
The fault-based divorce regime was designed to fulfill two primary 
functions, both deeply at odds with the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.  First, fault divorce was based on the overarching principle that 
wives were subordinate to their husbands and on sex stereotypes envisioning 
men as strong, disciplinarian, and independent, and women as passive, 
nurturing, and subservient.52  Divorce law in this capacity functioned as 
paternalistic legislation, with fault grounds that intended only to protect 
women from “the most harmful implications of their inferior status without 
attempting to change their status significantly.”53  Some fault-based grounds, 
 
gendered marital roles); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1112 
(1989); Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 823–24 (1989).  
 51 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (noting that, traditionally, sex discrimination 
had been “rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put 
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage”). 
 52 The fault system was originally based on Christian doctrines that urged the “necessity of female 
submission to male dominance.”  VanSickle, supra note 7, at 163; see also, e.g., Ephesians 5:22–24; 
Linda C. McClain, The “Male Problematic” and the Problems of Family Law: A Response to Don Browning’s 
“Critical Familism”, 56 EMORY L.J. 1407, 1428 (2007); Rebecca L. Corrow, Shaping the American 
Family by Inaction: The United States Constitution and “The Family,” 1788–1920, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 7, 8 (2004). 
 53 See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 
172, 179 (1988) (arguing that fault divorce envisioned that women needed not equality, only 
paternalist protection from the worst physical and moral effects of their marital subordination); 
VanSickle, supra note 7, at 158 (stating that the fault system is an “archaic divorce form founded 
upon gender inequity—a form that subordinates women by casting them into the role of victim”); 
id. at 178 (arguing that fault thresholds “serve an infantilizing function, portraying women as little 
more than fragile and dependent children who need to be protected from the treachery and 
duplicity of men”); Lawrence Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1497, 1525 (2000) (“It was socially acceptable for a woman to be a victim; women 
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for example, were framed in avowedly gendered terms, offering women 
protection from the excesses of male authority.  To illustrate, since “[m]an 
is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender,” as the Court’s infamous 
Bradwell decision paternalistically assumed,54 Alabama law accorded a wife 
marital release when her husband defied this dictate and “his treatment to 
her [wa]s cruel, barbarous and inhuman,” while Tennessee’s law referenced 
a husband’s conduct “which would make her living with him unsafe and 
improper.”55  
Second, the fault regime was also based on sex-role stereotypes, normative 
assumptions that conceived of husbands as market participants and of wives 
as the mistresses of the home, a role that entailed economic dependency, self-
sacrifice, and subservience.56  We have already observed, in the first half of 
this diptych, how the laws of marriage constructed and maintained these 
status relations by, for example, denying spouses the freedom to contractually 
alter the gendered expectations of the traditional marital contract.57  Even 
more effective, however, were the laws of divorce, which were structured to 
reward those who conformed to normative gender roles and to penalize those 
 
were, after all, the weaker sex. It was difficult for a man to claim he was deceived, deserted, or 
beaten up by a woman.”). 
 54 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 55 Jane Turner Censer, Smiling Through Her Tears: Ante-Bellum Southern Women and Divorce, 25 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 24, 27 (1981) (quoting statutes); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These 
Boots are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 149 
(2000) (finding that wives account for virtually all of the filing under the cruelty ground in the states 
examined); MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570–1640, 
at 180 (1987) (explaining that in England, where the fault system was inherited from, husbands 
rarely sued their wives for cruelty because they feared being ridiculed by a society which believed 
husbands should control their wives). 
 56 See generally Cahn, supra note 50 (discussing the historical importance of conformity with gender roles 
in divorce proceedings); Nicole D. Lindsey, Note, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of “I Do,” an Analysis 
of the Ever-Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 280 (1998) (describing how 
the fault system emphasized traditional gender roles and threatened the economic independence of 
women); VanSickle, supra note 7, at 171, 175 (noting that divorce judges have been influenced by 
gendered assumptions of women as “inherently different from and inferior to men” and of “female 
frailty and passivity”). 
 57 Yefet, supra note 2, at pt. III; see also, e.g., Watkins v. Watkins, 192 Cal. Rptr. 54, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941)) (“[A] married 
woman cannot contract with her husband with respect to domestic services which are incidental to 
[the] marital status . . . .”); Mays v. Wadel, 236 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind. App. 1968); Jill Elaine 
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 866–70 (2004). 
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who transgressed them.58  Indeed, since marriage laws were usually very brief 
in detailing spousal rights and responsibilities,59 divorce law—through the 
fault grounds it provided for dissolving a marriage—articulated the law’s 
normative vision of marital life.60  By enforcing the marital exchange of 
lifelong male support for lifelong female services, fault-based dissolution 
artfully reproduced the distinctions between male and female spheres of 
influence.61  Further, the double standard encapsulated in fault grounds—as 
some scholars of divorce have rightly concluded—manifested a “judicial 
blindness to the faults of men and indifference to the difficulties faced by 
women.”62  
Historically, this double standard has made itself especially apparent in 
the domain of sexual activity.63  Adultery is the earliest and most widespread 
rationale of divorce in the United States.  Concededly, only a few divorce 
codes explicitly differentiated the sexual activities of wives and provided for 
marital dissolution upon only a wife’s adultery.64  In practice, however, the 
sexual double standard was virtually universal.  In courtrooms, women were 
 
 58 Indeed, the failure to meet sex-role obligations was the most common basis for Victorian divorce. 
See generally ROBERT GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850–1890: VICTORIAN 
ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES (1982); ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA (1980).  See also Lindsey, supra note 56, 
at 280; Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce 
Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 634 (1997); Singer, supra note 50, at 1100–12. 
 59 Margaret Sokolov, Note, Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1974). 
 60 PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 226–27 (claiming that the gender-specific obligations of the marriage 
contract were so central that failure to adhere to them provided a basis for divorce); Ariela R. 
Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 963 (2000). 
 61 F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561, 
574 (2001) (“[B]arriers to divorce facilitate the traditional homemaker/wage earner marriage 
. . . .”); June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and 
Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 988, 1008 (1991). 
 62 William E. Nelson, Patriarchy or Equality: Family Values or Individuality, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 435, 
514 (1996). 
 63 Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. 
REV. 503, 552 (1994) (criticizing the fault regime for being “too much based on now-obsolete ideas 
about gender”); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason To Revive An Old Rule, 53 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 379 (2006) (arguing that the fault regime stigmatized both men and women, 
portraying one as a “dishonorable villain” and the other as a “pathetic victim”); RHODE, supra note 
6, at 27; Eric V. Wicks, Fault-Based Divorce “Reforms,” Archaic Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1565, 1596 (2000) (claiming that fault divorce is based on archaic concepts of gender roles). 
 64 This was the case with Massachusetts’ divorce law, for example.  See PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 
137–39, 147; RILEY, supra note 6, at 13. 
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subject to much stricter standards of purity than men, both before and during 
marriage.65  While a woman usually had to prove multiple male adulteries to 
divorce her husband, a single act of female infidelity was generally enough to 
set a man free.66  Stereotypes also abounded about men’s voracious sexual 
appetites and about women’s reluctance to have sex.67  A wife who refused 
sexual relations might be deemed in breach of the marriage contract and 
could neither hold her husband to his duty of support nor liberate herself by 
divorce.68  Indeed, ensuring husbands’ unrestricted access to their wives’ 
bodies was a keystone of the marital bargain that formed the blueprint for 
the fault system.69  To give but one example of the extent and force of a 
woman’s sexual duty, a late-nineteenth-century divorce case sketched a 
marital reality in which the husband had recurrently imposed himself on his 
wife, whose medical condition rendered sexual intercourse extremely 
painful.  However, the court failed to find these conjugal circumstances 
sufficiently “grave and weighty” to warrant marital freedom.70   
The gendered treatment of sexual appetites also came into play in the 
judicial regulation of the condonation defense, commonly offered when 
spouses continued to cohabit following adultery.71  For divorce courts, wives 
 
 65 For example, while courts found fault with a wife who had failed to disclose a previous pregnancy, 
they did not in the case of a husband whose wife could establish his undisclosed prior sexual activity, 
including impregnation a girl who bore him a child out of wedlock.  See Yucabezky v. Yucabezky, 
111 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1952); Pankiw v. Pankiw, 45 Misc. 2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 
Monroe Cty. 1965); see also NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE 
REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 170–71 (1999); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 
82 GEO L.J. 2525, 2526 (1994) (showing that fault divorce has a history of abuse as it had been used 
to reinforce stereotypes about women’s sexuality and to keep women in their place; the traditional 
fault paradigm reflected an obsession with controlling women and their sexuality).  
 66 Singer, supra note 50, at 1111. 
 67 Friedman, supra note 53, at 1528. 
 68 See, e.g., Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. App. 1926). 
 69     The most blatant manifestation of this regime is the marital-rape exemption which still persists in 
various forms in a majority of American jurisdictions.  For a fascinating account of this regime, see 
Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000). 
See also COTT, supra note 49, at 66–67. 
 70      English v. English, 27 N.J. Eq. 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1876). 
 71 A party was said to have condoned the misconduct if the innocent petitioner appeared to have 
forgiven the marital offense, as by moving back in with the spouse originally at fault.  See John J. 
King et al., Note, A Survey of the Law of Condonation, Connivance and Collusion in New England, 35 B.U. L. 
REV. 99, 103 (1955).  Even a single act of intercourse after the alleged misbehavior could be 
construed as an attempt at reconciliation and could consequently bar a divorce.  See, e.g., Hammer 
v. Hammer, 309 N.E.2d 874, 874 (N.Y. 1974). 
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as subordinate spouses could be understood, and even applauded, for 
forgiving adultery and showing patient forbearance, while husbands who 
sought to repair marital ties with unfaithful wives were penalized by being 
denied divorce altogether.72   
In addition, judges interpreted ostensibly gender-neutral legal authority 
in ways that favored men over women and gave rise to intersectional gender 
and class discrimination.73  For example, isolated incidents of violence by a 
woman’s husband generally did not amount to legal cruelty,74 especially 
when the violence was perceived as provoked by wifely scolding or 
rudeness,75 and at times even “actual and repeated violence” was insufficient 
to warrant female marital emancipation.76  As Reva Siegel aptly phrased it: 
[J]udges developed a body of divorce law premised on the assumption that 
a wife was obliged to endure various kinds of violence as a normal—and 
sometimes deserved—part of married life. . . .  [T]he evidence required to 
prove “extreme cruelty” varied by class, on the doctrinally explicit 
assumption that violence was a common part of life among the married 
poor.77   
 
 72 Cahn, supra note 50, at 683 (noting the doctrine reaffirms the double sexual standard and women’s 
subordination within marriage); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Edw. Ch. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) 
(“[T]he effect of cohabitation as a condonation is less binding on a wife than it is on the husband: 
because . . . she may entertain better hopes of the recovery and reform of her husband, her honor 
is less injured and is more easily healed; and so far from its being improper that she should for a 
time show a patient forbearance, it is commendable in her to exercise it, with a view to reclaim 
him; which would not be tolerated in the husband where the wife should happen to be the 
delinquent party. Besides, she may find a difficulty either in quitting his house or withdrawing from 
his bed.”).  
 73 The judicial hostility to female marital freedom is apparent, for example, when comparing the 
differential treatment accorded to domestic violence in the contexts of criminal law and divorce 
law, respectively.  Whereas for purposes of criminal law, the prevalence of domestic violence among 
the “coarser” classes served to intensify the criminal prosecution of poor men, in the context of 
divorce, judges viewed the prevalence of violence as a reason to limit, rather than expand, women’s 
entitlement to marital freedom.  Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2134 (1996). 
 74 Id. at 2133 (explaining that to demonstrate that she was entitled to a divorce, a battered wife 
typically had to prove that her husband acted with “extreme” and “repeated” cruelty). 
 75 RHODE, supra note 6, at 28.  
 76 See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 455, 459 (N.C. 1868); see also Davies v. Davies, 37 N.Y. 45 
(N.Y. 1869) (using the defense of condonation to block a battered woman’s divorce petition). Even 
though the husband had “choked [his wife]; committed severe personal violence upon her, and 
struck her a blow with his fist upon the left temple, severing the temporal artery, and endangering 
[her] life,” the Davies court found that the wife’s continued cohabitation “implie[d] a forgiveness of 
such treatment” and held divorce unavailable “for such ill treatment, if in the interval, the 
defendant had treated his wife kindly and given her no further cause of complaint.” Id. at 46, 48. 
 77 Siegel, supra note 73, at 2134. 
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Divorce courts, therefore, often engaged in “close scrutiny” of female 
petitioners in order to establish whether they possessed “the tender delicacy 
of feeling that would be severely injured by verbal or mild physical abuse.”78 
In marked contrast, a single violent act of a wife against her husband was 
such a wrongdoing that she would be denied both separation and spousal 
support.79   
 A review of nineteenth- and early-to-mid-twentieth-century divorce 
cases not only reveals these double standards, but also exposes gendered 
narratives about what it meant to be a “faulty” or “innocent” spouse, 
transforming trial courts into a legal theater for the reaffirmation of 
constraining sex roles.80  Given the absence of a clear violation of gendered 
standards of performance that would suffice to establish a husband’s “guilt,” 
marital freedom was often out of reach for many women.  Consider, for 
example, the 1926 case of Mrs. Sitterson’s husband who was convicted of 
murder and sent to prison.  After failing to hear from him for a decade, Mrs. 
Sitterson eventually applied for divorce.  The court refused to free her from 
her own marital prison, however, because her husband’s absence was 
involuntary; she would only be entitled to freedom if she could prove that he 
had committed murder for the sake of fleeing his conjugal duties.81 
The same themes emerged repeatedly in divorce trials, as judges 
attempted, in the cogent words of Naomi Cahn, to “reinforce the authority 
of men and restrict the autonomy of women, to make them victims of 
conspiracies of men.”82  Indeed, judges insisted that a female petitioner 
seeking liberation not only had to prove her husband’s fault, but also had to 
 
 78 Censer, supra note 55, at 35. 
 79 Axelrod v. Axelrod, 150 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1956); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. 
Stern, The Winding Road from Form to Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1, 11–12 (2008) 
 80 Fault rhetoric reinforced patriarchy and hierarchy in the institution of marriage and highlighted 
the necessity of conforming with traditional gender roles.  To win a divorce, husbands and wives 
alike had to profess their compliance with gender norms while their opponents alleged their 
noncompliance.  As Naomi Cahn and others have concluded, the “cult of domesticity, together 
with the virgin/whore dichotomy, were thriving in divorce rhetoric.”  Cahn, supra note 50, at 661, 
669–70, 673 (“Fault served to signal the policing of gender norms; fault constricted behavior and 
punished women and men who transgressed.”); see also Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital 
Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95, 97–98 (1991); VanSickle, supra note 7, at 
158; Basch, supra note 34, at 12; BASCH, supra note 65, at 155. 
 81  Sitterson v. Sitterson, 131 S.E. 641 (N.C. 1926).  For a modern incarnation of this case, see Scheu v. 
Vargas, 778 N.Y.S.2d 663 (N.Y. 2004). 
 82 Cahn, supra note 50, at 673. 
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persuade the court of her own virtue and impeccable innocence; the 
appearance of chastity, respectability, morality, and female propriety thus 
played a prominent role in determining whether a wife would be entitled to 
marital release.83  If both spouses were guilty of marital wrongdoing, 
however, they were believed to deserve each other, not a divorce. 84  Thus in 
order to achieve a fault-based escape route, wives were frequently portrayed 
as, and encouraged to play, innocent victims stripped of agency and with 
injured femininity.85  So entrenched—and advantageous—was this role that 
wives played the victim even when they conceded the charges against them 
as defendants in divorce cases.86  
Divorce courts especially celebrated “dutiful and obedient”87 wives, 
rewarding their good behavior with a coveted divorce decree.88  Second only 
to the wifely virtues of submissiveness and docility was domesticity, cited by 
divorce courts as “sterling traits”89 essential for an innocent wife who showed 
 
 83 Censer, supra note 55, at 37–38; COTT, supra note 49, at 49. 
 84  This is the defense of recrimination.  For examples of cases in which the doctrine of recrimination 
was applied, see Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 557 So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 
1379 (1990). See also Schillaci v. Schillaci, 310 So.2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Maranto v. 
Maranto, 297 So.2d 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Canning v. Canning, 443 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn. 
App. 1968); Gundry v. Gundry, 136 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965).  For a particularly absurd 
example, see Kucera v. Kucera, 117 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1962).  
 85 As several commentators have argued, gender stereotypes mandate that women will almost always 
appear as the victim of physical violence or psychological cruelty, whereas husbands play the role 
of the abuser; women are chaste, loyal, and faithful, and husbands have large sexual appetites that 
make them go astray; women occupy responsibilities of nurturing and homemaking in the domestic 
sphere, while their husbands are in charge of bringing in the bacon and dominating the household. 
See Friedman, supra note 53, at 1528–31 (“[D]ivorce law almost forced women into a posture of 
submission and humility, into a mold of tender, injured femininity.”); VanSickle, supra note 7, at 
170, 175; Kimberly Diane White, Covenant Marriage: An Unnecessary Second Attempt at Fault-Based 
Divorce, 61 ALA. L. REV. 869, 878 (2010).  
 86 In one case, an adulteress claimed that God’s “strength has enabled me to confess the crime” to her 
husband and ensured her “affections are again entirely” for her husband.  Strong Divorce Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1865, at 8.  In another case, the wife confessed to disclaimed responsibility for her 
adultery because her seducer had exploited her “very feminine weakness in the face of male sexual 
passion.”  Cahn, supra note 50, at 679–80, 686. 
 87 Moyler v. Moyler, 11 Ala. 620 (Ala. 1847). 
 88 For example, in considering whether a wife was innocent enough to merit divorce, one court 
observed that, despite the wife’s own fault, more importantly she “submitted in meekness, smiling 
through her tears, to an almost continued flow of insult and unmerited contumely.”  Rose v. Rose, 
9 Ark. 507, 516 (Ark. 1849); see also Censer, supra note 55, at 38–39. 
 89 Censer, supra note 55, at 40 (noting that courts applauded wives who exhibited feminine capabilities 
in domestic matters). 
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herself to be “industrious, managing and attentive to her domestic duties.”90  
So long as a wife abided by these conservative role expectations, both during 
and after marriage, the fault system rewarded her with custody, marital 
property, and lifetime alimony, thereby perpetuating marital gender roles 
long after a marriage ended.91  
Conversely, judges penalized disobedient women who challenged their 
husbands’ authority by blocking marital freedom.  Divorce courts construed 
the arcane defense of recrimination—which provided that “divorce on the 
ground of cruelty will not be granted if the ill treatment has been caused by 
the misconduct of the plaintiff”—to bar claims by women whose conduct was 
“incompatible with the duty of a wife” or who “justly provoke[d] the 
indignation of the husband.”92  Wives who were “wanting of conformity” to 
their husbands’ wishes were all met with judicial hostility.93  No matter how 
egregious their husbands’ conduct, these “forward females” were punished 
for their assertive behavior and deficient domesticity with the denial of their 
pleas for freedom.94  
Interestingly enough, normative assumptions about women’s agency and 
roles figured especially prominently when husbands were the ones 
petitioning for divorce.  Husbands who sought to rid themselves of “unruly” 
or “insubordinate” wives emphasized transgressions of womanly and wifely 
expectations to sympathetic courts.95  In the famous case of Beardsley v. 
 
 90 Rose, 9 Ark. at 507; see also Robinson v. Robinson, 26 Tenn. (7 Humph.) 440 (Tenn. 1846); Censer, 
supra note 55, at 38 (noting that judges favored well-bred and ladylike women, who were 
domesticated and possessed economical, prudent, and industrious habits). 
 91 An “unchaste” or otherwise immoral ex-wife could forfeit her right to support.  See, e.g., Taake v. 
Taake, 70 Wis. 2d 115, 129 (Wis. 1975); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 71 (Md. 1971); 
Daniels v. Daniels, 82 Idaho 201, 207 (Idaho 1960); Christiano v. Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 597 
(Conn. 1945); Annotation, Divorced Woman’s Subsequent Sexual Relations or Misconduct as Warranting, 
Alone or With Other Circumstances, Modification of Alimony Decree, 98 A.L.R.3D 453 (1980 & Supp. 1986); 
Singer, supra note 50, at 1109–11. 
 92 JOSEPH W. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 274 
(1931). 
 93 Gray v. Gray, 15 Ala. 779 (Ala. 1849); Trowbridge v. Carlin, 12 La. Ann. 882 (La. 1857); Naulet 
v. Dubois, 6 La. Ann. 403 (La. 1851). 
 94 See, e.g., Crow v. Crow, 23 Ala. 583 (Ala. 1853); Grey, 15 Ala. at 779; Trowbridge, 12 La. Ann. at 882; 
Naulet, 6 La. Ann. at 403.  
 95 Censer, supra note 55, at 39–40 (noting that courts punished “stubbornness and insubordination” 
in a wife, rebuking and denying her marital freedom); see also id. at 46 (explaining that judges looked 
unfavorably upon assertive or managing wives who were “neither long-suffering nor submissive”).  
Many cases vividly exhibit the gendered requirements of women to conform to their domestic roles 
as guardians of the home and caretakers of children and to be docile, chaste, and submissive, in 
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Beardsley, for example, the divorce-seeking husband ridiculed his wife’s 
deficient domesticity, attacked her chastity by calling her “the most brazen 
strumpet that ever defied God and men,” criticized her engagement in 
activities that contravened “wifely propriety,” and noted her failure to greet 
her husband “with the caresses which were his due . . . .”96  Tellingly, more 
than eighty percent of the divorce grounds invoked by men in the nineteenth 
century implied that wives had “refused to live up to the ideal of a submissive 
subordination.”97 
Even in the twentieth century, many husbands convinced courts to 
permit them to discard wives who failed to perform household tasks, 
discipline the children, follow husbands to places of their sole choosing, or 
who otherwise flouted male authority.98  For example, in one mid-twentieth-
century divorce case, the court found a wife—a college graduate who 
intended to pursue medical school—it deemed “a very ambitious lady” to 
have constructively abandoned her husband because he was not satisfied 
with the amount of attention she dedicated to their child.99  The court 
predicated its ruling on gendered prescriptions for women: “The father has 
a right to expect the mother to give the child that which is necessary for her 
development and good, as it is his duty to provide the means to effectuate 
that, both materially and in cooperation spiritually.”100  In so doing, courts 
adjudicating fault actively enacted and enforced family relations in ways that 
entrenched the traditional division of labor premised upon gender 
differentiation.  
 
order to avoid financial ruin.  See ROBERT GRISWOLD, ADULTERY AND DIVORCE IN VICTORIAN 
AMERICA, 1800–1900, at 21 (1986); E. Teitelbaum, Cruelty Divorce Under New York's Reform Act: On 
Repeating Ancient Error, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 28 (1974); RHODE, supra note 6, at 28; Carbone & Brinig, 
supra note 61, at 997–98. For one of the more extreme cases of judicial requiring of wifely obedience, 
see Fulton v. Fulton, 31 Miss. 154 (Miss. 1858). 
 96      ROBERT M. DEWITT, REPORT OF THE BEARDSLEY DIVORCE CASE 71, 73, 75–76 (1860). 
 97 PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 228 (quoting CARL DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN 
AMERICA (1980)).  Such grounds were adultery and desertion, which were at odds with the image 
of the Victorian wife, as well as cruelty, drunkenness, and failure to perform domestic duties.  Id.  
 98 Bennett v. Bennett, 79 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1951); CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE 
TALK: WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 55 (1990) (noting that a 
quarter of late-twentieth-century divorced men cited their wives’ failure at performing the role of a 
homemaker, complaining about their wives’ deficient skills at maintaining the house and for being 
lazy, “sloppy,” and “disorganized.”); Teitelbaum, supra note 95, at 28.  
 99 Rosner v. Rosner, 108 N.Y.S.2d 196, 200 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens Cty. 1951). 
 100 Id. at 201. 
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Divorce courts not only imposed norms of chastity, domesticity, and 
dependency on women, but simultaneously held men to a set of different, yet 
still constraining, gender role prescriptions.101  Divorce trials stressed the 
expectations that husbands serve as providers and protectors of their wives.102 
Accordingly, many state laws traditionally contained “nonsupport” or 
“neglect of duty” as a female divorce ground, and many courts construed 
cruelty to include a husband’s failure to provide financial support.103  By 
complaining about their partners’ deficient breadwinning skills, numerous 
women—but certainly no men—won marital freedom.104  
In conclusion, fault divorce encouraged—even required—gender-
conscious justifications for divorce that were explicitly or implicitly 
contingent on longstanding prescriptions about women’s normative roles.  
By making divorce available only when one spouse transgressed traditional 
marital roles and the other strictly embraced them, the judicial application 
of fault grounds enforced the very gendered stereotypes now repudiated by 
the Supreme Court's equal-protection jurisprudence.105  Further, the fault 
system, as we have seen, cultivated an image of feminine frailty and 
dependence and construed the court’s duty to protect female “victims.”  The 
Supreme Court now understands the Constitution to forbid paternalism of 
this kind: the state may not use laws to “reinforce[] stereotypes about the 
‘proper place’ of women and their need for special protection.”106  As Reva 
Siegel elucidates, gender-paternalism triggers equal-protection concerns 
 
 101 As Cahn observed, the “ideology of masculinity served as a critical balance to the ideology of 
femininity; domesticity (and marriage) depended on both the husband and wife performing their 
roles.”  Cahn, supra note 50, at 674–75. 
 102 VanSickle, supra note 7, at 172; see also Cahn, supra note 50, at 674–75 (explaining that the divorce 
cases reveal an emphasis on a husband’s economic success as a defining factor in his marital success). 
 103 SUZANNE M. BIANCHI & DAPHNE SPAIN, AMERICAN WOMEN IN TRANSITION 141 (1986); Biondi, 
supra note 7, at 616; DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 79, at 14–15; Charles W. Tenney Jr., Divorce 
Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 25 (1967) (noting that a husband’s neglect to provide 
“suitable maintenance” was a recognized fault ground in numerous American jurisdictions). 
 104 See, e.g., Smedley v. Smedley, 30 Ala. 714 (Ala. 1857) (stating that a husband’s failure to perform his 
legal duty of adequately supporting his wife constitutes cruelty); see also Cahn, supra note 50, at 675; 
Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 
41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 281 (2000).  
 105 Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 996 (2007) (noting that the equal-protection cases prohibit the use of law 
to entrench family roles rooted in separate spheres ideology, “not simply because this use of law 
restricts individual opportunity but also because it enforces group inequality”). 
 106 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–
25 (1982). 
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where other forms of paternalism do not, because of the denigrating 
assumptions about women such legislation reflects and the injuries it 
facilitates.107  Indeed, in the name of “protecting” women, a large body of 
law served to constrict female potential, limiting their involvement in the 
public and civic life of the nation.108  The fault regime exerted the same effect; 
by casting women into inferior and subservient roles, fault divorce facilitated 
the transformation of women into “wedlocked wives” and substantially 
subverted gender equality in society. 
B.  From Past to Present: Faulting Fault Divorce in Contemporary Courtrooms 
 The fault grounds still on the books in the twenty-first century are, to a 
considerable extent, relics of the nineteenth-century legislation we have 
discussed—laws enacted by all-male legislatures chosen by all-male 
electorates that restricted women’s choices without earning their votes. 
Remarkably, more than half of U.S. jurisdictions feature a mixed-ground 
dissolution regime that offers both newer no-fault grounds as well as 
traditional fault grounds which still permit judges to evaluate marital 
misconduct and spousal wrongdoing.109  For example, New York did not 
permit unilateral fault-free dissolutions until as late as the second decade of 
the twenty-first century, when the legislature supplemented the existing fault-
based menu with a no-fault divorce ground.110  In these mixed-ground 
 
 107 Siegel, supra note 105, at 1049.  For example, in Hogan, the state policy of limiting nursing school to 
female students was constitutionally impermissible because it perpetuated a stereotypical view of 
nursing as the sole province of women.  See Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: 
Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 803 (1986).  
 108 For example, a law preventing women from practicing law attempted to “‘sav[e]’ women because 
they are women from a combative, aggressive profession . . . .” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (emphasis in original). 
 109  Evan Wright, Agree to Disagree: Moving Tennessee Toward Pure No-Fault Divorce, 4 LINCOLN MEMORIAL 
U. L. REV. 86, 97–98 (2017) (showing that only seventeen states adopted a pure no-fault divorce 
system); Judith Areen, Uncovering the Reformation Roots of American Marriage and Divorce Law, 26 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 30–31 (2014) (“[S]ome divorcing spouses prefer to rely on a fault ground . . . .  
Litigants and courts in most states thus still wrestle with how best to interpret and to apply divorce 
requirements that were formulated centuries ago.”).  
 110  N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (2010).  Before the 2010 reform, no-fault was possible only upon 
mutual consent.  Given both the stringency of the proof required for establishing the fault-grounds 
and the ease with which defenses could defeat these grounds, a New York citizen often faced the 
risk of remaining chained to indissoluble marriage in the pre-reform era.  See Rhona Bork, Taking 
Fault With New York’s Fault-Based Divorce: Is the Law Constitutional?, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
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jurisdictions, roughly one third of divorces still proceed through the fault-
based system.111  There are still, however, two American jurisdictions which 
have consistently resisted unilateral no-fault divorce reform efforts, where 
fault grounds continue to dominate.112  This is also true of covenant marriage 
legislation which has been passed in three jurisdictions and proposed in more 
than a dozen others—the first Western laws in some two hundred years to 
make divorce more difficult to obtain.113  
Certainly, fault divorce today is no longer implemented in as stereotypical 
a manner as it used to be, and most judges do not consciously discriminate 
against women.114  Nevertheless, the fault regime remains susceptible to 
equal-protection challenges and, as this Part argues, it is still applied, at least 
occasionally, in ways that enforce inequitable gender relations.  Mainstream 
equal-protection analysis subjects to rigorous judicial review not only sex-
based legislative classifications, but also legislation neutral on its face yet 
enforced in a discriminatory manner.115  As the Supreme Court has 
 
165, 168–79 (2002); see also J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform 
Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559 (2007). 
 111  Karen Turnage Boyd, The Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce Laws Can Remedy the Unintended 
Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 609, 616 (2006); see also Pamela Laufer-
Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 209 (2010) (“[F]ault 
or blameworthy conduct is persistently relevant, whether as an option in divorce statutes, as a 
bargaining mechanism, or to gain advantage in financial and custodial matters.”); Areen, supra note 
109, at 31. 
 112  These states are Mississippi and Tennessee.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (effective Mar. 31, 2020); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103 (effective Mar. 6, 2020).   
 113  See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-901; Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-801; see also 
Heather Flory, “I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey . . . and Not Divorce You”: Covenant Marriage and the Backlash 
Against No-Fault Divorce, 34 FAM. L.Q. 133, 133–34 (2000); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Cove-
nant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 107 (1998). 
 114  This is part of the decline in moral discourse in family law as chronicled in Carl Schneider’s 
influential articles.  See Schneider, supra note 63; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the 
Transformation of Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985). 
 115 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–44 (1993) (tracing the history of equal-protection litigation to 
illustrate that facially neutral legislation may also be subject to strict scrutiny when applied in a 
racially discriminatory basis.); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (explaining that 
challenges to multimember voting districts violate the Equal Protection Clause if “conceived or 
operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination”) (internal citation omitted); City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (noting that while multimember legislative districts are 
not per se unconstitutional, such schemes could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose 
were to “minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities”); see also Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (“Sometimes a clear 
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even 
when the . . . legislation appears neutral on its face.”); Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
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acknowledged, “a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly 
discriminatory in its operation.”116  Insofar as fault grounds are informed by 
the sex-role prescriptions of the separate-spheres tradition and remain 
susceptible to sexist implementation, they are unacceptable even under the 
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the antidiscrimination principle.  
Indeed, there is an inherent danger embedded in a divorce regime based 
on evaluations of marital fault since, as Laurence Tribe cautions, laws and 
institutions to this day “still promote—with vast popular support—distinctive 
and restrictive gender roles,” such that some gender classifications are so 
woven into the entire social understanding of women that they reflect “what 
the judiciary itself still perceives as a genuine gender difference.”117  
Especially in this psychologically loaded context of marital dissolution, 
“discretion permits the judge’s own bias, reflecting his own place in the 
patriarchy, to serve as the unexamined predicate for his decision.  Divorce is 
governed not by law, but quite literally by the men who comprise the vast 
majority of family court judges . . . .”118  
An examination of contemporary fault-based divorce cases confirms 
these suspicions.  Divorce judges themselves candidly concede that their 
 
U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (explaining that legislation that includes a racial classification or that is facially 
neutral but is “an obvious pretext for racial discrimination” will survive a legal challenge “only 
upon extraordinary justification”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1483 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the actions of state courts and judicial officers are subject to the 
restraints of the equal protection clause); Eppler, supra note 107, at 796–97 (“[E]xtreme 
discrimination in the administration of a facially neutral law may provide proof of discriminatory 
intent.”). 
 116 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 & n.11 (1956).  Indeed, serious discrimination in the 
administration of a gender-neutral law may provide proof of discriminatory purpose.  See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not 
be applied so as invidiously to discriminate . . . .”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); 
see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 709 (10th ed. 1980) (“[P]urposeful, hostile 
discrimination is inferred from data regarding administration of a facially neutral law.”). 
 117 See TRIBE, supra note 115, at 1569, 1571.  This is a fair conclusion given that gender stereotypes 
may still affect even the nation’s highest court.  See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78–79 
(1981) (upholding a federal law limiting to men the duty to register for a military draft); Michael M. 
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466–73 (1981) (upholding a California statutory rape law 
punishing the young man but not the young woman for voluntary sexual intercourse); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (reinforcing the stereotypic view of women as vulnerable sex 
objects by upholding a law forbidding women to serve as guards in a maximum security prison for 
men). 
 118 Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. 
REV. 1483, 1519 (1991) (footnote omitted). 
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personal philosophies and prejudices affect their divorce decisions,119 and 
even female judges are known to act upon stereotyped myths, beliefs, and 
biases.120  State task forces investigating gender bias in late twenty-century 
divorce courts have all reported that “gender bias detrimental to women 
permeates every aspect of marital dissolution.”121  Divorce scholars have 
similarly found that courts have exhibited “a double standard for women and 
men in fault behaviors”122 and are still “more willing to find fault with women 
than men for the same conduct.”123   
Many judges still adhere to dated notions of appropriate gender behavior 
particularly when adjudicating the financial and custodial consequences of 
fault-based dissolution.124  In a 1991 case, for example, a court denied 
 
 119 RICHARD NEELY, THE DIVORCE DECISION: THE HUMAN AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
ENDING A MARRIAGE 27–28, 32 (1984) (discussing how the author, a divorce judge himself, 
cautions that “judges are human, and their decisions are influenced by their backgrounds, 
experiences, and—unfortunately—prejudices”); Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern 
Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 787 n.32 (1996) (noting that to this day many states attach far 
more consequences to a wife’s adultery than a husband’s); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman’s Constitution, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 468 (1984) (suggesting that lawmakers are influenced by the “traditional 
construct of woman” as wife and mother when making rules that impact gender roles). 
 120 Singer, supra note 50, at 1119 (noting that divorce judges who are women do not typically have 
experience with divorce and are not immune to the gender biases of their male counterparts). 
 121 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. L. REV. 181, 187 (1990); see 
also Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 
(1990) (noting that every study conducted by states and state court systems exploring gender bias in 
the judicial system has found a need for reform in order to eliminate the impact of gender bias on 
judicial processes and decision-making).  
 122 Susan Hager, Comment, Nostalgic Attempts to Recapture What Never Was: Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage 
Act, 77 NEB. L. REV. 567, 582 (1998) (noting that courts more readily conclude that a woman is at 
fault and less able to perform parental responsibilities than men under identical circumstances); see 
also Bradford, supra note 58, at 634 (describing the different consequences in divorce proceedings 
for men and women who commit adultery); Lucinda M. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal 
Protection Clause: Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13 
TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429, 431 (2004) (comparing the severity of social consequences for men 
and women who abandon their children or bear children out of wedlock); MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 
72 (1991) (concluding that judges could not as a group be trusted to protect wives and children). 
 123 Lindsey, supra note 56, at 281; see also RIANE TENNENHAUS EISLER, DISSOLUTION: NO-FAULT 
DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 136, 190 (1977); FINEMAN, supra note 122, 
at 72 (noting the belief among advocates of divorce reform that trial judges exhibited patterns of 
bias against women); Singer, supra note 50, at 1111 (discussing examples of women’s exposure to 
harsher penalties than men for the same behaviors).  
 124  It should be stressed that my analysis, which espouses a unilateral no-fault right in access to 
divorce, is limited to the core right to marital exit but does not address the regulation of the incidents 
of divorce.  The latter category, which introduces complexities of its own and is still a source of 
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alimony and provided only limited property to a severely ill and needy 
woman because she had begun an extramarital relationship after separating 
from her husband.125  In the same vein, modern divorce courts have been 
often guided by double standards for sexual behavior and work priorities in 
resolving custody battles.126  While women’s perceived “promiscuity” may 
cost them custody of their children,127 as affirmed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court,128 the very same conduct from men “rarely disables” their custody 
 
contention among feminists, is beyond the scope of this article and is analyzed in a separate work.  
Yefet, supra note 35; see also, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don't Let Divorce off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2006, at 14LL (calling for “a prudent and realistic search for new approaches to enacting 
our shared moral understanding of marriage”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Beyond the Bounds of Decency: 
Why Fault Matters to (Some) Wronged Spouses, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 503 (2009); Harry Krause, 
On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault Torts to Re-Emerge in the Guise of Torts, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1355 (2003); see also  Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 111 (observing that feminists still “have mixed feelings 
about fault divorce”). 
 125 Rgm v. Dem, 410 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1991); see also Woodhouse & Bartlett, supra note 65, at 2557–
58; Ellman, supra note 119, at 787, n.32 (“[M]any states . . . attach far more consequence to a wife’s 
adultery than a husband’s.”).  
 126 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Taylor, 274 P.3d 46 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding, in part, decision 
to grant custody to father, inter alia, because of the mother’s claims that the judge’s comments and 
journal entry reflected “a personal and gender bias” against her; for example, the court mentioned 
that shortly after the divorce she became pregnant out of wedlock by a man she had not known for 
long while applying “a double standard of morality” that held her to a higher standard than the 
father); see also Schafran, supra note 6, at 42–43 (discussing how women seeking custody may be 
punished for life-styles and social arrangements that are acceptable for men); Schafran, supra note 
121, at 192 (explaining that mothers are held to a different and higher standard of parenting and 
personal behavior than fathers).  For the traditional operation of this regime, see HOMER H. CLARK 
JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 585 (1968) ("[T]he commonest case [is], where the divorce is 
granted for the wife’s adultery. Some courts have been unduly rigid in refusing to give the wife 
custody where it appeared quite clearly that the child would be better off in her care."). 
 127 See, e.g.,  Stibich v. Stibich, 2016 Ark. App. 251, 491 S.W.3d 475 (Ark. App 2016) (living with a 
boyfriend out of wedlock warranted a change in custody); Chastain v. Chastain, 672 S.E.2d 108 
(S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that “flagrant promiscuity” is a relevant factor in determining the 
moral fitness of a parent—in this case the mother—to raise a child); Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 
1190 (Ala. 1998) (reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirming the trial court’s 
order granting a change of custody from mother to father based on her open lesbian relationship 
and given that “the father and the stepmother have established a two-parent home environment 
where heterosexual marriage is presented as the moral and societal norm”); Collins v. Collins, No. 
87-238-II,1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (affirming the trial court's decision to 
award custody to the remarried father because of the mother’s “gay lifestyle”); see also RHODE, supra 
note 6, at 189 (explaining that “promiscuity” is frequently cited as grounds for custody challenges); 
Bradford, supra note 58, at 634 (finding that courts frequently rule that women accused of adultery 
or promiscuity cannot provide an acceptable home for children). 
 128    See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 449 U.S. 927 (1980) (custody was changed from mother to father because 
of ex-wife’s subsequent nonmarital relationship). 
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petitions.129  Consider the 2018 case Cordell v. Cordell, in which the court 
ordered a change of custody from mother to father based, inter alia, on the 
mother’s “immoral conduct” in dating a married man.130  The court 
concluded that “[i]f there's any hope that the children are raised with any 
morals it will have to be with . . . [the father],” notwithstanding the father’s 
previous engagement in similar activities.131  Divorce courts have also been 
known to prefer fathers who admit to having been serial adulterers to 
mothers in stable lesbian relationships; one court even found it superior to 
award custody to a father convicted of murder than to a lesbian mother.132  
Fault determinations especially risk penalizing women who defy 
traditional gender paths or who lack proper housekeeping standards.133  In 
D.H. v. J.H, for instance, the court awarded custody to the father because of 
the mother’s failure to be “a model housekeeper” given that dishes were left 
unwashed and laundry was left lying on furniture while the husband had to 
fix meals for the children because “the wife was out running around.”134  
Working mothers, in particular, may still be viewed with suspicion by many 
family court judges.135  Women’s widespread participation in the labor force 
 
 129 Bradford, supra note 58, at 634; see also, e.g., Alphin v. Alphin, 219 S.W.3d 160, 165  (Ark. 2005) 
(affirming a trial court order changing custody from mother to father by relying primarily on the 
“illicit sexual relationship” between the mother and her new husband prior to their marriage, which 
the court viewed as “nothing but a ruse,” while ignoring both similar conduct by the father—who 
married his girlfriend when she was three months pregnant with his child—and the fact that the 
father initiated the change-of-custody petition only after the mother sought child support from him). 
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision based on the mother’s “lack of stability”: she 
moved frequently and did not have a fixed schedule because of her job which meant that on some 
nights only her mother was able to be home at her child’s bedtime.  In contrast, the Court was 
impressed with the father’s new wife for making “a point of leaving work every day in time” to pick 
up the child.  Id. at 166; see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 341 (noting an exception to this rule when 
the father is accused of homosexual conduct); Hanna Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and 
Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly,  4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J 94, 124–25 (1988) 
(noting that judges tend to deprive homosexuals of custody). 
 130  Cordell v. Cordell, 565 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018). 
 131  Id. at 506. 
 132 For a description of such relatively recent cases, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 189. 
 133 See Bradford, supra note 58, at 621; see also Biondi, supra note 7, at 611, 623–24 (“[F]ault-based 
divorce laws ultimately rely on inconsistent and subjective family court judges to define fault.  
Further, these definitions may be influenced inappropriately by biological and cultural assumptions 
about women and their proper social and familial roles.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 134   D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). 
 135 See Czapanskiy, supra note 121, at 4 (noting that judges have found mothers who work unfit for 
custody and sometimes require more evidence for a female litigant to prove her custodial fitness 
than for a male litigant). 
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notwithstanding, mothers who challenge traditional gender roles by 
appearing career-focused or relying on daycare may risk losing custody.136  
Going before divorce judges, women are in a bind: they are viewed as 
incapable of being good parents if they work “too much,” but as incapable 
of supporting their children if they don’t work “enough.”137  Husbands, 
however, are seldom faulted for being “overly” committed to their careers, 
and they tend to be rewarded by judges “for any small effort made to 
participate actively in their child’s life, while [judges] view similar behavior 
by women as routine.”138  
The gendered faults of fault divorce do not end here.  Perhaps the most 
troubling phenomenon in contemporary courtrooms is the minimization of 
domestic violence allegations in divorce proceedings.139  Many battered 
women who experienced various forms of abuse were thus found wanting, 
and failed to surmount the court-defined barrier of “cruel and inhuman 
treatment” that warrants marital freedom.140  In Palin v. Palin, for example, 
the wife proved that she was both physically and verbally abused by her 
husband yet the court deemed this marital misconduct as nothing more than 
 
 136 See Bradford, supra note 58, at 634 (noting that several well-publicized custody battles have involved 
attempts to take children away from mothers who use daycare or who are supposedly too 
committed to their careers to spend “enough” time at home); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 189–
93 (describing cases in which mothers were denied custody because judges did not believe they 
could raise children and work or pursue an education); Schafran, supra note 6, at 56 (describing 
cases that show that women experienced difficulties in securing judicial permission to relocate with 
their children for work-related reasons while custodial fathers were generally permitted to move for 
job opportunities). 
 137 RHODE, supra note 6, at 192–93; CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 40, at 157.  
 138 Bradford, supra note 58, at 634–35 (explaining that the presence of a second wife, mother, or even 
a hired housekeeper to care for the child in the father’s life may tip the scales in his favor in a 
custody battle); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 189–90 (noting that fathers are praised for successful 
careers, while mothers may be cast as selfish for taking on work outside of the home). 
 139 Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question, supra note 7, at 727; see also Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, 
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 183 (1992) (discussing a North 
Carolina study finding that allegations of paternal abuse of wives or children seldom affected 
judicial custody decisions); Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 
24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 565 (2010) (“The belief that women make false 
accusations of abuse to win custody or divorce lawsuits, or simply as an act of vindictiveness, is 
commonplace in the justice system’s treatment of domestic violence.”).  
 140  See, e.g., E.D. v. M.D., 801 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Cochran v. Cochran, 912 So. 
2d 1086, 1090–91 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Ladner v. Ladner, 49 So. 3d 669, 672 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2010); see also S.K. v. I.K., No. 203247-2008, 2010 WL 1371943, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 
2010).  For further discussion of such cases, see Lauren Guidice, New York and Divorce: Finding Fault 
in a No Fault System, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 787, 801–04 (2011).    
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“unpleasant.”141  The court also held her continued cohabitation with her 
husband against the wife, thereby turning a blind eye to the feminization of 
poverty that plagues many women's economic ability to physically separate 
from their abusers.142  The same fate awaited Mrs. Gross, whose husband of 
thirty-seven years rammed her up against the walls of the house and imposed 
himself on her sexually.  Mrs. Gross’s pleas for marital emancipation fell on 
deaf ears, however, since “[r]eprehensible and highly offensive behavior . . . 
is not necessarily sufficient to establish the cruel-and-inhuman-treatment 
ground for divorce.”143  The New York Court of Appeals further added insult 
to injury by stressing that the lengthier the marriage, the higher the degree 
of proof required to set a divorce-seeker free.144  
Moreover, it is still a common misconception that so-called vindictive 
women make such allegations simply to gain an advantage in negotiation or 
at trial,145 and judges with these beliefs sometimes deprive women of custody 
if they make such allegations.146  Some judges also view battered women who 
escaped the marital home to a protected shelter as unfit mothers for 
abandoning their children.147  
 
 141  Palin v. Palin, 624 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding that the trial court erred by 
determining that the wife was entitled to a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment). 
 142  See id. at 632. 
 143  Gross v. Gross, 836 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2007). 
 144  See id. (reversing the lower court's decision to grant a divorce). 
 145 Elizabeth Mertz & Kimberly A. Lonsway, The Power of Denial: Individual and Cultural Constructions of 
Child Sexual Abuse, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1415, 1454 (1998); see also Joan S. Meier, Notes from the 
Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1307–08 (1993) (“[C]ustody courts routinely reject battered womans’ [sic] 
claims of abuse as fabrications, exaggerations, or irrelevant to the welfare of the children.”).  
 146 Rita Berg, Parental Alienation Analysis, Domestic Violence, and Gender Bias in Minnesota Courts, 29 L. & 
INEQ. 5 (2011) (noting anti-mother gender bias in the Minnesota legal system and concluding that 
mothers may be unfairly prevented from attaining custody of their children when alleging domestic 
violence); Megan Shipley, Reviled Mothers: Custody Modification Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 86 IND. 
L.J. 1587, 1588 (2011) (describing courts’ tendencies to “disbelieve or minimize mothers’ accounts 
of domestic violence”); Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question, supra note 7, at 728 (discussing cases in 
which mothers lose custody after alleging abuse by their children’s fathers); Susan Beth Jacobs, The 
Hidden Gender Bias Behind “the Best Interest of the Child” Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 845, 858 (1997) (noting that courts’ failure to recognize the “inherent immorality” of fathers 
who abuse mothers “result[s] in an increasing number of mothers who are losing custody of their 
children”). 
 147 MICH. SUP. CT., FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER 
ISSUES IN THE COURTS 64, 69 (1989) (reporting task force findings showing that women who leave 
abusive husbands may be disadvantaged in custody proceedings); Bryan, Reasking the Woman 
Question, supra note 7, at 727 (“Judges sometimes deprive battered women of custody when they flee 
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To conclude, examining past regulatory practices can illuminate tacit 
forms of bias structuring present regulatory practices.  Given the fault 
system’s historical function as a form of gender-caste regulation, it is not 
surprising that the adjudication of fault, at least occasionally, may still be 
influenced by status-based reasoning about women’s roles and identities.  
Since fault-based divorce may continue to facilitate gender-based 
decisionmaking, even a divorce regime that is structured around formal 
equality must center on a no-fault concept that does not mandate conformity 
to or transgression of conservative gender ideologies.148  No-fault grounds, in 
contrast, present women with the opportunity to leave relationships that are 
confining and subordinating without having to confront—or profess 
adherence to—gender stereotypes, biases, and inequalities.149  Moreover, by 
guaranteeing rights of exit to spouses who do not conform to dated moral 
standards or traditional gender roles, no-fault divorce also contributes to de-
gendering marriage and affords spouses a meaningful choice to pursue 
egalitarian ideals during their relationship.150  Finally, no-fault economic 
rules reconstruct the marital bargain and promote a more egalitarian sharing 
of marital responsibilities by withdrawing support for the traditional 
exchange of male support for female services and protection for obedience.151  
 
the marital home without the children.”); Meier, supra note 145, at 1310 (noting that women 
involved in custody disputes are often accused of abandoning their families and denied custody as 
a result). 
 148  Apart from facilitating discriminatory divorces mired with gender stereotyping, the fault system also 
erects substantial barriers for victims of domestic violence.  See Bell, supra note 6.  In contrast, a 2006 
study of the impact of unilateral no-fault divorce found “a striking decline in female suicide and 
domestic violence rates arising from the advent of unilateral divorce.”  See Betsey Stevenson & Justin 
Wolfers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress, 121 Q.J. ECON. 267, 286 
(2006). 
 149 See Cahn, supra note 50, at 695 (“Under the no-fault system in contemporary law, the norms of 
gendered marital behavior are irrelevant to receiving a no-fault divorce.”); see also Jana B. Singer, 
The Privatization of Family Law, WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1518 (1992) (noting that no-fault divorce is an 
alternative to a system that was “rife with gender stereotypes and inequalities”); VanSickle, supra 
note 7, at 174 (noting that a no-fault regime empowers women as the primary initiators of divorce). 
 150 COTT, supra note 49, at 206 (explaining that no-fault divorce signifies that the state is barred from 
“passing judgment on performance in an ongoing marriage and allow the partners to decide 
whether their behavior matched their own expectations . . . .”); Elizabeth Baker et al., Covenant 
Marriage and the Sanctification of Gendered Marital Roles, 30 J. FAM. ISSUES 147, 152 (2009) (“The 
weakening of social norms and expectations that govern spouses’ behavior allows wives and 
husbands more freedom to negotiate the gendered terms of their marriages.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 151 No-fault treats women not as the dependents of male earners but as fully capable of labor force 
participation and supporting themselves.  See, e.g., Carbone & Brinig, supra note 61, at 961–62 
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In all these ways, a no-fault path to marital emancipation operates to 
dismantle the gender hierarchy fostered by marriage and serves as a 
counterforce against the reification of sex-role stereotypes.  In short, a right 
to no-fault divorce is a bedrock component of equal citizenship for women 
even given the narrow and formal confines of the antidiscrimination 
principle. 
III. TURNING BACK THE PATRIARCHAL CLOCK: THE NEW-OLD AGENDA 
TO RESTRICT DIVORCE  
A number of states are currently considering proposals that seek, among 
other restrictive regulations, to eliminate no-fault grounds and restore fault 
as the exclusive basis for divorce.152  Like their historical predecessors, many 
legislators endeavoring to reinstate fault today view liberal divorce rights as 
facilitating derogations of wifely duties and female obedience.153  Put 
 
(explaining how the no-fault movement has disrupted gender roles by “adjusting the incentives for 
marital behavior”); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 40, at 112–13 (arguing that no-fault divorce 
contributed to the dismantling of a marital model that enforced women’s economic dependence on 
men); Fineman, supra note 40, at 853–67.  Indeed, no-fault divorce has had a “major impact” on 
women’s employment.  See Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 114, at 1809; Ann L. Estin, 
Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 523 (1995); Lindsey, supra 
note 56, at 280. 
 152  The most recent proposal, backed by the Coalition for Divorce Reform, is a South Dakota House 
Bill to remove no-fault divorce that was introduced by South Dakota State Representative Tony 
Randolph on January 29, 2020.  See H.R.1158, 2020 Leg. (S.D. 2020); see also Yefet, supra note 35, 
at ch. I.  For an instructive summary of the multifaceted critiques against the no-fault divorce 
revolution and the calls for a counter-revolution that espouse a return to a fault-based regime, see 
Ayelet Hoffmann Libson, Not My Fault: Morality and Divorce Law in the Liberal State, 93 TUL. L. REV. 
599, 607–614, 642 (2019) (calling for a “hybrid model of fault in divorce law” that assigns marital 
misconduct a prominent role in determining post-divorce outcomes).  Lynn Wardle, writing at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, elucidates:  
The intensity and breadth of the dissatisfaction with the current regime of unilateral no-
fault divorce is so great that it has been described as a ‘counter-revolution’ against no-fault 
divorce . . . . [C]ommentators and politicians across the country decry the loss of ‘family 
values’ and urge legislative and social reform to bring back the traditional family . . . [This] 
very significant divorce reform in the United States at the present time . . . is likely to 
continue to be a major social force in the coming decade.  
  Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 
783, 794, 799 (2000) (internal citation omitted).  Wardle further observes that “it appears that there 
is a significant, widespread, and growing social movement to reform unilateral no-fault divorce 
laws.”  Id. at 784.  
 153  Indeed, to this day, the wife who seeks divorce and walks out of “her” domestic responsibilities may 
be viewed as “the psychological equivalent of the mother who abandons; she is a monster.”  Stark, 
supra note 118, at 1509; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER 
INEQUALITY 185 (1999) (stating that sponsors of fault divorce seek to restrain “walkaway wives,” as 
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differently, as related by this Part, there is much evidence to suggest that 
legislators attempting to enact restrictions on divorce may be seeking to 
“save” not just marriage in general, but patriarchal marriage in particular, 
in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.   
Though the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to 
prohibit government from enforcing gender-differentiated marital roles,154 
this vision of the family, and of government’s role in protecting it, still 
remains attractive to many.  Opponents of divorce have recognized the 
connection between the right to marital freedom and the social, economic, 
and psychological emancipation of women, and they have linked their 
opposition to divorce to their support for the “primacy of the husband with 
regard to the wife and children, and the ready subjection of the wife and her 
willing obedience.”155  
A major backer of the contemporary movement to limit divorce is the 
American marriage movement, a loosely-organized coalition of conservative 
social critics, religious traditionalists, and academics that seek to strengthen 
the traditional family and enforce gender-specific marital roles.156  For 
 
women who are the ones who overwhelmingly initiate divorce).  While calls to restrict divorce 
certainly also rest on benign and even commendable interests such as protecting the welfare of 
children, this is not enough to neutralize prejudiced motives.  The Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected the proposition that the existence of an allegedly permissible motive “trumps any proof of 
a parallel impermissible motive.” Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985). 
 154 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 105, at 997 (“The case law treats laws that enforce gender-differentiated 
family roles, regardless of whether they purport to protect women, as enforcing an illegitimate form 
of stereotyping or caste resembling race discrimination.”). 
 155 J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF 
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 32 (1997) (quoting POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL 
LETTER: ON CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE 21–64 (1931)); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE 
DIVORCE CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 105 (1998) 
(“Many liberal academics fear that raising concerns about the hardships of divorce for children may 
play into the hands of the political right.  ‘Family values’ conservatives, they believe, are intent on 
driving women back into traditional homemaking roles and even dangerously abusive marriages, 
thus undermining women’s considerable progress toward freedom from domestic misery and 
tyranny.”). 
 156 LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 293 (2006) (“Too often, defenses of ‘traditional’ 
marriage and family values regard gains in women’s equality and personal self-government as being 
in tension with strengthening families.”); Norland, supra note 33, at 322 (suggesting the American 
Marriage Movement was inspired in part by “political backlash against the rights of women”); 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Divorce, Children’s Welfare, and the Culture Wars, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 107–
08 (2001) (noting that divorce reform proposals are part of a “reactionary social agenda being 
promoted by those who would like to return to traditional marriage and gender roles”); Singer, 
supra note 50, at 1104 (“[T]he perceived attack on no-fault divorce and on equality-based divorce 
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marriage movement members, divorce rights “threaten to destroy the 
sanctuary once provided by the father-dominated, home-centered, mother-
dependent, traditional family.”157  Many traditionalists thus expressly 
criticize no-fault for being inimical to specialization within the family—
especially men’s engagement in paid employment and women’s focus on 
domestic and caretaking work158—and couch their stance with sexist rhetoric 
on women’s traditional roles and the wifely duty to obey.159  Accordingly, 
many promote limitations on divorce in order to restore the “patriarchal 
hierarchical structure and sharply differentiated gender roles” of traditional 
marriage.160    
Even reformers who disclaim any desire to “turn back the clock” still 
blame the weakening of marriage on “feminism, women’s increasing 
 
reform threatens to reinforce old stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women and to fuel 
public nostalgia for a return to the ‘good old days’ (before women’s liberation) when fathers worked, 
mothers stayed home, and virtuous parents never got divorced.”). 
 157 Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law 
in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2091 (2000); see also MCCLAIN, 
supra note 156. 
 158 Through reforming no-fault divorce laws into stricter laws, marriage promoters seek to reward 
investment in domestic activities in order to persuade women that specializing in household work 
and childcare is not a risky endeavor.  See Maggie Gallagher, Re-Creating Marriage, in PROMISES TO 
KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 233–45 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 
1996); Allen M. Parkman, Good Incentives Lead to Good Marriages, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION 
OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 69, 72–77 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002) 
(“Traditionally, spouses were reluctant to make sacrifices associated with specializing in domestic 
activities during marriage unless they had the expectation of a long-term relationship; marriage was 
associated with that expectation.”); Carbone & Brinig, supra note 61, at 988 (explaining that 
traditionalists favor a contract approach to marriage that encourages specialization within the 
marriage by imposing financial penalties on the spouse who initiates divorce (the “at-fault” spouse)); 
Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 
879, 889 (1988) (noting that under no-fault regimes, couples internalize the fragility of the marital 
partnership and act as if their marriage is fragile, which may actually cause the relationship to be 
fragile). 
 159 White, supra note 85, at 880–81 (noting that some religions promote women’s subservience to men 
and discourage divorce, even when the husband is abusive).  For example, some Christian and 
Muslim leaders, who advocate legal restrictions on divorce, instruct husbands, as the heads of their 
households, to employ domestic violence to discipline women rather than divorce them, and direct 
wives to endure the abuse and save their marriage “at all costs”; indeed, they are told that their 
“lack of submissive behavior” is “in part responsible for the violence.”  Colleen Shannon-Lewy & 
Valerie T. Dull, The Response of Christian Clergy to Domestic Violence: Help or Hindrance?, 10 AGGRESSION 
& VIOLENT BEHAV. 647, 649, 651 (2005); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of 
Religious Deference, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2007). 
 160 Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687, 712 (1994) 
(pointing to this tendency). 
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economic independence, and their higher expectations of sex equality, 
gender equity, and intimacy within marriage.”161  Moreover, the fact that 
most family law reformers have manifested little concern about gender 
inequality in marriage, despite overwhelming evidence that it destabilizes 
these unions,162 reinforces the conclusion that they “are seeking to strengthen 
not just any marriage but a particular form of marriage, and one that women 
will increasingly find unattractive.”163  Tellingly, some prominent advocates 
of divorce restrictions explicitly reject equal responsibilities in marriage as 
“nonsense”164 or “androgyny.”165 
The Natural Family: A Manifesto, a 2005 statement issued by an affiliate of 
the World Congress of Families, is an especially revealing example—
endorsed by “prominent national leaders of the traditional family values 
movement”166—that overtly grounds opposition to marital freedom in a 
vision of gender-differentiated family roles.  The authors, Alan Carlson and 
Paul Mero, stress their traditional view of marriage and family roles as the 
basis for their resistance to liberal divorce, adultery, same-sex marriage, and 
abortion.167  They celebrate the gender-differentiated family and view it as a 
fact of nature,168 encourage state policies that regulate work and family 
relations to reward parents who adhere to stereotypical gender roles in 
 
 161 MCCLAIN, supra note 156, at 119 (documenting and criticizing this tendency among marriage 
promoters). 
 162 See, e.g., id. at 44 (“One form of inequality within marriage that may lead to instability, including 
divorce, is women’s disproportionate performance of caregiving and household tasks.”); see also 
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 
189 (2002) (characterizing the ideal of “gender equality” as “nonsense,” that it is “a fancy of the 
upper middle class” and claiming that “ordinary men and women do not think that way”). 
 163 Bartlett, supra note 5, at 842–43. 
 164 WILSON, supra note 162, at 189. 
 165 MCCLAIN, supra note 156, at 147; see also David Popenoe, Modern Marriage: Revising the Cultural Script, 
in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 247–61 (David 
Popenoe et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the changes in marital roles and the subsequent confusion and 
discord arising between spouses).  
 166 Siegel, supra note 105, at 1005. 
 167 Allan C. Carlson & Paul T. Mero, The Natural Family: A Manifesto, in THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 
(2005). 
 168 See id. at 15 (“[T]he natural family is a fixed aspect of the created order, one ingrained in human 
nature,” and “legitimate governments exist to shelter and encourage the natural family”); id. at 29 
(“[W]e humans have been defined by the long-term bonding of a woman and a man, by their free 
sharing of resources, by a complementary division of labor, and by a focus on the procreation, 
protection, and rearing of children in stable homes.”); id. at 16 (“Culture, law, and policy should 
take these [gender] differences into account.  We affirm that the complementarity of the sexes is a 
source of strength. Men and women exhibit profound biological and psychological differences.”). 
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marriage, and deny women’s right to participate in education and 
employment on equal terms with men.169  While explicitly acknowledging 
their vulnerability to charges that they wish to subvert women’s rights and 
reinforce patriarchal violence,170 they nevertheless advocate policies 
designed to restore the gender-differentiated family of the 1950s.171  
To achieve these goals, among the marriage movement’s leading 
prescriptions is to “place the weight of the law on the side of spouses seeking 
to defend their marriages [and] end state preferences for easy divorce by 
repealing ‘no-fault’ statutes,”172 so as to “build a new culture of marriage,”173 
and allow husbands and wives to “be nurtured toward and encouraged in 
their proper roles.”174 
Another notable example is a statement issued in 2011 by David R. 
Usher, the president of the Center for Marriage Policy, and Michael J. 
McManus, the president of Marriage Savers.  Entitled “‘Ten Marriage 
Economic Policies’ to Rebuild America,” this document identifies no-fault 
divorce laws as “a mistake that encouraged marital irresponsibility.”  The 
statement’s first policy recommendation accordingly calls for a reform of 
divorce law by only permitting a mutual-consent divorce and restoring the 
fault-based regime.  This new-old system would “permit divorce for defined 
reasons, which must be proven” while rewarding the spouse who seeks to 
preserve the marriage with three fourths of the marital assets. The 
overarching goal of this policy, according to the statement, is to return 
America to a marriage-based society which would “naturally resolve” the 
 
 169 See, e.g., id. at 25–26. 
 170 Id. at 24. 
 171 Id. (“It is true that we look with affection to earlier familial eras such as ‘1950’s America.’  We look 
with delight on this record and aspire to recreate such results.”).  Carlson and Mero admire the 
American family model of the 1950s, attribute its fall in part to feminism and no-fault divorce, and 
decry the following events as undermining the desirable social order.  Coupling together a criticism 
of liberal divorce policies and feminist challenges to traditional gender roles, they blame the “time 
of moral shock and awe” that was the 1960s:  
[N]ew legal challenges to successful family wage systems; conscious efforts to drive the 
Creator out of civic life; the rapid spread of pornography; new demands for easy divorce; 
attacks on the meaning of ‘wife’ and ‘husband’; a swelling rhetoric of ‘gender’ and ‘sexual’ 
rights; conscious state campaigns aimed at population control; steps toward easy abortion; 
claims of sexual revolution; rejection of the concepts of duty and long-term commitment; 
and startling advances in the manipulation of human life.  
  Id. at 10. 
 172 Id. at 19. 
 173 Id. at 18. 
 174 Id. at 28. 
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“major problems of most unmarried mothers and their children” and ensure 
“[a] woman’s right to be supported by, cared for, and helped by her 
husband.”175  Marriage Savers also recommends the replacement of state 
subsidies of cohabitation with marriage subsidies that would “[a]sk unwed 
mothers at the birth of their baby if they are cohabiting; if so, do not give 
state subsidies—unless they marry and take classes teaching conflict 
resolution skills.”176 
A bill along these lines has been proposed in at least two states.  The bill 
designates the person who seeks to preserve the marriage as the “responsible 
spouse” who would get at least 70% of marital assets and half of child custody 
time.  However, “if there is actual evidence, with high evidentiary standards” 
that the divorce-seeking spouse is the victim of physical abuse, adultery or 
abandonment, “then s/he would be entitled to the benefits of a ‘responsible 
spouse.’”  The reform would also oblige the divorce court to divide both 
assets and debts since “[c]urrently, they do not have to dispose of debts, 
which the husband usually ends up with, an unfair pattern that often leaves 
him broke.”177  As for child custody, the bill is predicated on the supposition 
that “[y]oung children need the love of a mother most, and teenagers most 
need the discipline a father can offer” and thus envisions a reversal of custody 
arrangements from mother to father as children grow older, which “would 
happen automatically, unless a spouse is found unfit or waives it.”178 
The juxtaposition of gender prescriptions and divorce restrictions allows 
us to infer that the “the real aim” of divorce reform proposals is to “enforce 
a narrow and moralistic vision of marriage”179 in which women are 
homemakers and men head the household.180  Feminists are therefore 
 
 175  David R. Usher & Michael J. McManus, “Ten Marriage Economic Policies” to Rebuild America, CTR. 
FOR MARRIAGE POL’Y (Aug. 10, 2011), http://marriagepolicy.org/2011/08/10-marriage-values-
policies/. 
 176  Mike McManus, Proposed Louisiana Divorce Reform and Cohabitation Reform, MARRIAGE SAVERS (Feb. 
5, 2013), http://marriagesavers.org/sitems/News/News1030216Reform.htm.  
 177  Id. (detailing the bill introduced in Missouri and the bill expected in Louisiana). 
 178  Id. (“[C]ustody is divided 50-50, based on the number of years till the child is 18.  If he is aged 4, 
the mother would get custody for 7 years till age 11, then the father would have 7 years of custody 
till age 18.”). 
 179 Katha Pollitt, Can This Marriage Be Saved?, NATION, Feb. 17, 1997, at 9. 
 180 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101 (1995) (describing some tactics used by proponents of 
traditional marriage that include casting single mothers as “deviant”); Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral 
Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997) (explaining a traditionalist view that 
 
832 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:3 
   
 
rightfully concerned that reforms that inhibit marital freedom jeopardize 
women’s equal status in both the family and society and lay the foundation 
for gender-based stratification.181  
When the advocacy of divorce-restrictive regulations is considered in 
light of the gender bias that may animate it, it is clear that exit barriers being 
sought today offend constitutional guarantees of equal protection.  Such anti-
divorce laws would use the power of the state to upbear the patriarchal family 
structure based on constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women 
to the constraining sex-roles of the separate-spheres tradition.  Yet, as the 
Supreme Court elucidates, “[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped to a 
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place 
in society.”182  Limitations on divorce that restrict, degrade, and endanger 
women violate not only the forms of dignity and decisional autonomy 
constitutionally guaranteed to women by the Court’s “due process equality” 
jurisprudence, but also by the Court’s very equal protection gender-
discrimination cases.  Against this backdrop, legal challenges to strict divorce 
laws should be properly seen as part of a larger challenge to a long legal 
tradition of imposing gender roles on women that limited their public and 
private identities to their prescribed roles as wives and mothers.  
CONCLUSION  
This diptych has conceptualized the right to marital freedom in a gender-
equality framework.  It has argued that any constitutional concept of gender 
equality, whether formal or substantive, must guarantee a right of exit from 
an institution that has long been a locus of female subordination and still 
leaves many women vulnerable to dependency, exploitation, and abuse.  The 
use of law to force a woman to remain subject to her husband is a 
simultaneous affront to her liberty, dignity, and equality interests.  It 
entrenches archaic understandings of marital roles the Constitution now 
repudiates and exposes women to systemic gender-based injuries both inside 
and outside marriage.  All substantive visions of equal protection thus 
 
divorce is selfish, and arguing that children have a “morally based claim to require their parents to 
stay together”).  
 181 Accordingly, all currents of feminism recognize resistance to the reintroduction of fault and the 
enforcement of the traditional marital bargain as an obstacle to gender equality.  See, e.g., Kay, supra 
note 157, at 76–77; Carbone & Brinig, supra note 61, at 1010; see also Vansickle, supra note 7, at 156, 
178; Scott, supra note 156, at 95–96. 
 182 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
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envisage marital freedom as a remedy against state-facilitated gender 
subordination and dignitary harm inflicted through marriage.  As a result, 
marital exit has naturally grown to become a sex-salient practice which 
disrupts group inequality and helps ameliorate certain forms of gender 
stratification.  The law’s response to the divorce question thus bears heavily 
on women’s equal citizenship in society, influencing what opportunities 
women will have to participate fully in the nation’s social, political, and 
economic life.   
The antidiscrimination interpretation of equal protection, especially anti-
stereotyping concerns, is also implicated in divorce laws.  The historical 
analysis proffered in this Article reveals the lineage and function of divorce 
restrictions as gender-caste regulation.  Oppressive marriage laws and limited 
rights of exit have combined to promote traditional notions of masculine 
domination and feminine submission and to cement the “natural” gender 
order.  Fault grounds in particular were informed by and in turn reproduced 
and reinforced the separate-spheres ideology by policing the ways in which 
men and women performed gender within marriage.  By limiting exit and 
simultaneously defining marital relations in ways that perpetuate status 
inequalities between spouses, the state has shored up the patriarchal family 
and denied women the equality and dignity that they are entitled to as 
citizens.  These legislative badges of state-imposed female disempowerment 
must be eliminated as part of the constitutional movement towards a more 
just and equal society.    
Moreover, the contemporary calls to reinstate  a facially neutral fault 
scheme are also suspect according to a formal equality theory.  This Article 
has exposed such divorce-restrictive regulations as animated, at least in part, 
by a constitutionally impermissible purpose.  These antidivorce proposals 
would not only impose gender-specific burdens on women, but also reflect 
status-based judgments about women’s capacities, roles, and destinies from 
which they have been emancipated by modern sex-discrimination 
jurisprudence.  Just as importantly, because divorce restrictions coerce 
women to perform the work of wifehood without altering the conditions that 
continue to make such work a principal cause of their subordination, they 
are a form of status-reinforcing state action that offends constitutional 
guarantees of equal protection.  
A unilateral right to no-fault divorce, by contrast, accords women the 
dignity of controlling their personal relationships and deciding for 
themselves, as self-governing moral agents, for how long and on what terms 
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to stay in marriage.  A liberal dissolution right is a crucial form of self-defense 
against the subjugating effects of private patriarchy which enables women to 
disencumber themselves from stereotypes that would confine them to 
constraining sex role prescriptions.  Finally, the unimpeded availability of 
marital freedom may promote gender equality as an organizing principle of 
family life, by giving women leverage within marriage to resist unjust marital 
arrangements and to establish more egalitarian unions after divorce. 
All in all, a right to unilateral no-fault divorce is fundamental for women 
attempting to navigate the world as equals and is imperative for a 
constitutional democracy committed to disestablishing gender hierarchy and 
second-class citizenship.  Marital freedom is thus not simply a legal remedy 
for broken hearts, but the linchpin of a social order committed to securing 
genuine gender equality and human dignity for all women. 
